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ABSTRACT 
This thesis focuses on three questions: First, what type of propositions provides a helpful 
framework to investigate a state‟s nuclear ambition? Secondly, what are the driving forces 
behind Iran‟s nuclear program. Thirdly, is Iran a threat to international security? Thus, this 
thesis is not concerned about the type of Iranian nuclear program be it military or civilian 
program but looks at the reasons of pursuing a nuclear program in the first place. In addition, 
the researcher outlines international relations security frameworks, before extracting a 
hypothesis and applying it to the case of Iran. It is also important to apply theoretical 
frameworks in analyzing Iran`s nuclear intentions. For this purpose, three theories will be 
utilized and these are realism, constructivism and Copenhagen approach. Furthermore, this 
thesis provides a summary of technical issues and the current status of Iran‟s nuclear program 
and the military aspect of Iran focusing on its missile program in relation to interpretation of 
realism, constructivism and Copenhagen approach. A narrow assessment of history shows the 
political development of the case until September 2015. In the literature, it is widespread to 
comment that Iran might pose an immediate threat for the USA and European security and 
interests. In the same vein, Iran‟s situation does offer a chunk of notable reasons which 
becomes a matter of concern, particularly when it concerns nuclear non-proliferation and the 
balance of regional security. It is also necessary to investigate the causes of nuclear 
proliferation on a comparative level. Thus the case of India, Pakistan and Israel will be 
highlighted although this will not be the focus of the study. 
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ÖZET 
Bu tez üç soruya odaklanmaktadır: İlki, bir devletin nükleeri elde etme isteğini araştırmak için 
ne tip bir önermenin yardımcı bir çerçeve sağlayabileceğidir. Ikincisi, İran‟ın nükleer 
programı arkasındaki itici güçlerin ne olduğudur? Üçüncüsü, İran‟ın uluslararası güvenliğe bir 
tehdit mi olduğudur? Böylelikle, bu tez İran‟ın nükleer programının askeri veya sivil olma 
yönü, yani programın türü ile ilgilenmemekte, bir nükleer programı takip etmesinin 
arkasındaki nedenlere bakmaktadır. Buna ek olarak, araştırmacı, hipotezini geliştirmeden ve 
onu İran örnek olayıyla ilişkilendirmeden önce, uluslararası ilişkilerin güvenlik çerçevesini 
ana hatlarıyla belirtmektedir. Teorik bir çerçeveye başvurmak, İran‟ın nükleeri elde etme 
isteğini analiz etmek için önemlidir. Bu nedenle, realizm, inşacılık ve Kopenhag yaklaşımı 
olmak üzere üç teoriden yararlanılacaktır. Ayrıca, bu tez, konuyla ilgili teknik meseleler, 
İran‟ın nükleer programındaki mevcut durum ve İran‟ın füze programı üzerinden askeri 
duruşu hakkında, realizm, inşacılık ve Kopenhag yaklaşımının yorumları ile bağlantılı bir özet 
sunacaktır. Dar kapsamlı bir tarihsel değerlendirme, örnek olayın siyasi gelişiminin Eylül 
2015‟e kadar olduğunu göstermektedir. Literatürde, İran‟ın ABD‟nin ve Avrupa‟nın güvenlik 
ve çıkarları için yakın bir tehdit olabileceği yorumu yaygındır. Aynı şekilde, İran‟ın durumu, 
özellikle nükleer silahsızlanma ve bölgesel güç dengesi göz önünde bulundurulduğunda, 
dikkate alınacak nedenler yığını ortaya koymaktadır. Nükleer silahlanmanın nedenlerini, 
karşılaştırmalı bir düzeyde araştırmak gerekmektedir. Bu nedenle, bu çalışmanın odağında 
olmamasına rağmen, Hindistan, Pakistan, İsrail örnekleri vurgulanacaktır.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The proliferation of nuclear weapons might pose a serious danger of triggering a 
nuclear war. One hundred and ninety countries signed a treaty prohibiting and 
managing the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) came into active force in the year 1970. According to NPT Conference of 
1995 signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty agreed to indefinitely extend 
possibly an effective nuclear non-proliferation framework.  The NPT is now 
established as the center of global nuclear non-proliferation policies. A narrow 
summary idea is that every state should have the right to use nuclear energy for 
civilian reasons, however the military utilization is prohibited and solely allowed for 
the five countries that exploded a nuclear device before the 1st of January 1967, and 
these are France, China, United Kingdom, Russia and USA. All types of control and 
verification in order to enforce compliance by member states of the NPT are 
conducted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The founding of The 
IAEA can be traced back to the launch of nuclear non-proliferation efforts conducted 
by the Atoms for Peace Policy in 1953. Atoms for Peace Policy statement was 
pronounced by the former USA President Dwight in 1953 at the United Nations 
(UN). 
 
Security issues has been raised by the non-aligned and non-nuclear weapon states 
which for example called for the disarmament such as calling for the disarmament of 
the nuclear arms owned by the five nuclear weapon states, in line with Article 6 of 
the NPT. Under Article 6 of the NPT, signatories of the agreement seek to follow up 
on consultations under the principle of good governance to put strong regulations on 
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the control and eradication of nuclear arms all. In addition, there are demands calling 
for member‟s legal rights to utilize civilian nuclear power.   During the era of the 
Cold War two states militarized their nuclear programs and they were not regarded as 
nuclear weapon states under the NPT, these were Israel and India.   After the end of 
the Cold War there were four cases of nuclear proliferation that attracted serious 
focus. These were North Korea, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan. In 2006 on the 9th of 
October, North Korea tested a nuclear device arousing affirmed suspicions that the 
state was pursuing a military nuclear program. North Korea also developed 
intercontinental ballistic missiles, further testing them several times of the last few 
years.  The second state of proliferation was Pakistan, conducting a successful a 
nuclear test in 1998 due to conflict and tension between Pakistan and India.  
 
Pakistan possesses ballistic missiles capabilities. International Atomic Energy 
Agency in 2008 noted that Iraq had highly developed nuclear weapons program 
however with limited capabilities to deliver the weapons as was stated also by the 
UN Special Commission in 1991.  The forth case that of Iran has caused serious 
debates among the United Nations as well as the UN Security Council (UNSC) as 
Iran was suspected of developing nuclear capability from 2003. Iran also started 
developing ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. 
 
Research problem 
The question of how to stop nuclear proliferation is linked to the task of investigating 
the reasons why some countries execute nuclear weapon programs. By investigating 
a country‟s ambitions in acquiring a nuclear bomb, solutions can also be created to 
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manage nuclear proliferation. This study therefore aims to review the theoretical 
approaches to nuclear proliferation so as to provide an account of Iran`s nuclear 
program. 
 
Research objectives 
First this research seeks to investigate the driving forces behind Iran`s nuclear 
program. Many questions have been raised by various researches as to the factors 
driving the Iranian nuclear program. The objective of this study is to open up the 
major reasons as to why Iran is pursuing a nuclear program. It is important to note 
that Iran is not the only state with a nuclear weapons program or that has pursed such 
a program. Therefore, the reasons collected and investigated can be numerous and 
related in various instances.  
 
The second objective of this study is to assess if Iran‟s nuclear program is a danger to 
local and global security. Security is of paramount importance to the international 
system. States contribute stability or instability through their actions or inactions. 
Therefore, to investigate Iran‟s nuclear actions such as nuclear proliferation and also 
Iran‟s inaction such as violation of international laws of weapons if any helps to be 
able to understand the threat posed both on a regional and global scale. The types of 
security affected will also be identified as a broader view of security is necessary to 
understand. 
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The final objective of the thesis is to assess the adequacy of international security 
theories and frameworks in explaining Iranian nuclear program. Several security 
frameworks and theories have been formulated it is imperative to study which ones 
can provide a structural examination of data and facts on the case study in question 
that is the Iran nuclear program. A systematic study is essential to come up with an 
organized conclusion of the relevant data and facts about the Iranian nuclear 
program. 
 
Research questions 
The objective listed above lead the research to ask important questions. Firstly, what 
are the driving forces behind Iran‟s nuclear program? The forces to be examined are 
not confined to political matters but also socio-economic factors that may have or are 
propelling the Iranian nuclear program. To answer this question systematically 
entails a background research of the Iranian political and social structures as major 
factors influencing the defense policy of Iran. The forces pushing the nuclear agenda 
in Iran must be divided into intra and external categories. The former forces include 
those factors emanating from within Iran, either from a regime perspective or from a 
citizen point of view. On the other extreme, there are external forces that are those 
factors stirring the nuclear agenda from outside Iran. These might include but not 
limited to regional politics and the unequal distribution of power at the UN as well as 
international regulatory laws concerning nuclear programs such as the IAEA. 
 
Having answered the first question, the researcher is led into another question that is 
the security impact of Iran‟s nuclear program. Does Iran‟s nuclear program pose a 
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threat to regional and international security? These effects might have regional 
foundations but at the same time some effects will expand into the global securıty 
system as the balance of power and complex international relations of various state 
and non-state actors come into play with the issue concerned. Last but not least the 
researcher seeks to connect the above questions and objectives in an attempt to 
provide a meaningful examination of the theoretical relevance of the various 
frameworks used in the Iran nuclear case study. Therefore, do certain security 
theories adequately explain the forces behind Iran‟s nuclear program? A multifaceted 
questioning approach seeks to understand the Iran nuclear program from a diverse 
perspective. This collaboration is necessary to give the study a broader and deeper 
scope. 
 
Justification of the study 
The study of nuclear proliferation is of utmost importance in understating the threats 
to international security and regional order. The thesis will therefore be of 
importance in understanding the parameters of what causes nuclear proliferation. It is 
also necessary to understand the relationship between international and domestic 
factors in nuclear proliferation. Scott‟s model will also be tested and assessed on its 
validity to give policy directions in the attempts of nuclear non-proliferation by 
governments and organizations. For the academic field, the thesis will provide a 
theoretical study of international relations theories, international conflict 
management and arms control. The thesis will highlight current issues, challenges, 
gaps and loopholes and thereby it will contribute to academic knowledge on nuclear 
proliferation. 
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A research methodology is an approach that explains what one has to do in order to 
manage the research from open to close. The research is footed on a case 
examination design derived from documentary search. Documentary exploration is 
the study of recorded human communications, such as books, websites, and laws 
mostly. This study is mostly qualitative rather than quantitative because of the nature 
of the issue under investigation. Documentary search included secondary sources of 
information including text books, periodicals and articles; these will be used to 
inform the investigation. The internet sources will also be utilized extensively to 
supplement these sources. 
 
The inaccessibility of useful firsthand information is one limitation the study has 
faced. While a case study is relatively cheap in terms of time, the design posed some 
restrictions on the quality of findings for the purposes of generalizations. The 
geographical location of the current researcher hinders observations as a data 
collection tool which in turn affects the quality of the investigations. The study made 
particular reference to the intentions of Iran in pursuing a nuclear program. Therefore 
the study is not concerned about the type of nuclear program which Iran is pursing 
thus it could be civilian or military program that is not the focus of the research. The 
research will investigate the reasons for the overall nuclear program in Iran. A 
holistic approach will be made to study the situation from international factors to 
domestic factors that contribute to proliferation. It is also necessary to investigate the 
causes of nuclear proliferation on a comparative level thus the case of North Korea, 
India, Pakistan and Israel was highlighted although this will not be the focus of the 
study. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: A 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Theoretical arguments about how nuclear proliferation should be interpreted and 
whether cases of future nuclear proliferation can be predicted have emerged as a 
security topic worth investigating. Several reasons can be noted for this. The 
downfall of the Soviet Union has increased calls for nuclear non-proliferation and 
disarmament.  It is also academically prudent to analyses other relevant theoretical 
arguments. Three theories can be utilized to reach this end; realism, constructivism 
and Copenhagen approach.
1
 This research will focus on these three due to the 
inability to exhaust all security approaches in one paper. Secondly realism and 
Copenhagen approaches gained a lot of reputation in the international relations field 
as sound analysis frameworks. The wide research carried out under these two has 
been so exhausted to the point of losing meaning. Hence an examination of realism 
and Copenhagen approaches is vital. Lastly but not least constructivism links 
domestic influences to state`s foreign policy behavior thus is worthy taking a look at. 
This chapter will discuss the history, theoretical assumptions of each theory and the 
relevant interpretations to international security studies revealing the strengths and 
weakness of each school of thought. 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Barry Buzan, "New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century." International Affairs, 
(1944-), 67, 3, (1991), pp. 43-45. 
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1.1 A theoretical view of realism 
Realism is as old as history for it was noted as far as the end of the First World War. 
It is also associated with theories of Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes. Realism 
has been branched further into classical realism and neo realism. Classical realism 
was the ancient interpretations of social and political relations. Hobbes, Thucydides 
and Machiavelli are closed related to realist thought and they offer a set of 
interpretations about society similar to those in realism. International relations 
authors such as Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz are well known realist 
proponents.
2
 
 
Thomas Hobbes‟ work called The Leviathan noted that politics was in a pre-societal 
state of nature where there was no social contract or agreements.
3
 Hobbes made three 
propositions about the state of nature firstly that men are all equal, secondly that men 
interacted in anarchy and lastly that men are motived and drive by desire for glory 
which comes through intense competition. The combination of these three 
assumptions will result in a war of all men against all. The notion that men are equal 
is associated with the idea that weaker can also defeat the stronger through secret 
plots or by uniting with other weaker men to form a stronger union. This results in 
the equality of capacities and therefore equality in execution of goals. In short, a man 
is as able to do or have anything as another man thus every man ought to have as 
much as other men. However, the notion of scarcity and limited opportunities hinders 
men from having an equal share hence the result is natural enmity. The intense 
                                                          
2
 Kenneth Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory," International Affairs, 44, (1990), pp. 39-
48. 
3
 Thomas Hobbes. Leviathan: „Or, the Matter, Form & Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and 
Civil‟, 1904. (A. R. Waller University Press), p. 29. 
9 
 
 
  
competition increasing hostility as man initially invade another for prestige, then 
secondly attacks or defends for security and lastly becomes hostile only to maintain 
reputation. Hobbes argues that despite the absence of gains, men would only resort to 
defensive actions due to the fear of other men. Men will fight for reputation because 
he expects that his peers will respect and value him at the same degree that he values 
himself. Such a case is worsened by the absence of a central authority which in 
modern times is referred to as a government. There is an absence of a common and 
legitimate overriding power to check and balance the conduct of men creating a 
perpetual state of anarchy or disorder and war. Hobbes describes the conditions in 
the polity to be short, poor, brutish and solitary. Inequality is inevitable this creates 
an imposed order of hierarchy based on force and capacity rather than on consent.  It 
is important to note that while conflict is not always occurring, the natural condition 
is that conflicts will swiftly and easily turn into violent reaction in most cases. 
 
Hobbes went on to note that such a society never existed in reality. As one way or 
another mankind always formulate other peaceful means of resolving conflict other 
than war. It can be argued that Hobbes‟ theory is mostly applicable to the behavior of 
great powers and to the condition of global politics. This is because interactions 
between unequal states are most likely to be regulated by another set of ideas other 
than what Hobbes claim.
4
 Some questions have been asked as to the specific 
application of Hobbes‟ theory since international politics is vast, which parts of 
politics are characterized by disorder, equality and selfishness? To answer such a 
                                                          
4
 Thomas Hobbes. Leviathan: „Or, the Matter, Form & Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and 
Civil‟, 1904. (A. R. Waller University Press), p. 29. 
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question, it is important to look at other theories that explain further the interaction of 
men in the world as a global society. 
 
Like other classical political thinkers, Thucydides was a realist who commented on 
issues of the international system, the individual and the state in international politics 
and lastly the reasons for war and its justification. In his masterpiece, the History of 
the Peloponnesian War he argues that the international system has no overreaching 
authority to regulate the behavior of actors.  This might explain why a state might 
have a nuclear program for military of civilian use because a nuclear capable state 
has leverage over regional and international politics. Hobbes assumptions of the 
State of Nature, all men are equal and thus the weak has also strength and capacity to 
kill the strongest, by secret machination as well as by confederacy with others that 
are facing the same threat zone.
5
  North Korea being initially a relatively weak state 
compared to the USA would want to achieve parity through technical advancement 
especially in the field of nuclear development. This might explain why like North 
Korea might be interested in a nuclear weapons program for peaceful uses or 
otherwise. The state might feel threatened by the hegemonic dominance of the USA 
in the Korean Peninsula as well as the world. 
 
Insecurity and fear, the desire for prestige or glory, and self-interest are normal and 
natural human characteristics, hence implying that human conduct has uniformity 
and is very predictable.
6
  A state`s insecurity and fears cannot be accurately predicted 
                                                          
5
 Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory," pp. 39-48. 
6
 Hans Morgenthau, Scientific Man versus Power Politics, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1946), pp. 12-32. 
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but considering there is a threat from a regional opponent chances are that a nuclear 
program can be meant to increase a state‟s prestige and cover up insecurities 
regionally and international. It is also important to balance between need for nuclear 
development and insecurity.  To answer this question accurately it is important to 
understand a state‟s foreign policy as well as regional balance of power. On a general 
note when this argument is applied to states it can be seen that there is a desire to 
acquire a defensive and hegemonic position by states in an attempt to seek a redress 
caused by the disparities in the international system. Such disparities include the 
structure of the international system comprises the UN which has the five permanent 
members such as the USA, Russia, Germany, France, Britain and China holding 
more decision-making power than the rest as a result of the post-World War 2 
settlement putting the strong nations into veto holding positions. This might explain 
why the permanent powers of the UN with nuclear weapons all have veto power to 
regulate the weaker nations and ultimately govern the international system based on 
a power position.  
 
The tenants posed in this theory shows why states get into wars and also recognizes 
the differences in power capabilities of states and its impact of state actions. 
Therefore, power can be obtained through various means including nuclear 
capabilities.
7
 A state can therefore try to obtain power through its nuclear program. 
The most outstanding weakness of these assumptions is that they are power oriented 
basing only on a state‟s nuclear program as power based thus fail to identify other 
factors such as the power of democratic citizens to influence foreign policies, 
                                                          
7
 Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Thompson, Politics Among Nations, 6th edition (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1985), p. 165. 
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idealism and the rule of law instead of power. These assumptions are linked to 
realism in regards to state survival and the use of capabilities to pursue national 
interest. 
 
In this instance, how much support does a state receive on its nuclear program from 
citizens? To answer this question, it is important to understand that in democracy 
citizens holds parliamentary as well as presidential elections to decide the nation‟s 
policy makers including nuclear program. Definitely the decision to purse nuclear 
weapons might not be directly a citizen demand but the backing of the citizen might 
propel a regime to pursue nuclear capabilities.
8
 Thus the elections held are a source 
of citizen support to the administration that whatever defense policy the government 
is working on, it has a mandate from the people to execute freely. In a way, this 
notion attempts to explain why states seek military dominance over others and why 
states priorities survival over morality as was during the two disastrous world wars 
when Germany under Hitler pursed an aggressive foreign policy towards Europe.  
Again, the issue of morality seems to be subjective. The western world perceives it to 
be moral to have a nuclear program for peaceful uses at the same time they regard 
North Korea‟s pursue of nuclear program as immoral and problematic.9 
 
Hobbes argued that human beings are by nature individualist and seek to maximize 
power at the expense of others. Social structures are usually ineffective in taking out 
the human nature which for him was a perpetual restless desire for power that could 
only end in death. In any social or political setup, human beings by nature are always 
                                                          
8
 Niccolo Machiavelli: „The Prince‟, 1513 (Fordham University) pp. 29-35. 
9
 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 88. 
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struggling for power.  A state‟s nuclear program might be explained as a struggle for 
power and dominance inherent in human nature. However, power can still be 
obtained without the need to possess it at the expense of other states. A state is also 
entitled under international law to defend itself against perceived enemies. As a 
result, mankind and states tend to seek power and protection from such a lawless 
state of nature as the struggle for scarce resources becomes fierce. Hobbes‟ argument 
seem to be less applicable in today‟s world as states are signatories of international 
law and members of organizations that make binding rules on all members thereby 
removing lawlessness. Thus, to state that a nation is pursuing a nuclear program 
because of a lack of central authority might not be accurate enough. When such an 
interpretation is taken on an international level it entails anarchy, state egoism and 
struggle among international actors who are naturally selfish.
10
 It implies that a state 
is by nature offensive and defensive which has led other theorists to modify the 
theory into defensive and offensive realism.
11
 This is in contrast to offensive realism 
which argues that a state might be seeking to maximize her influence and power 
economically, militarily and socially in order to maintain hegemony, security and 
domination as there is no central authority to guarantee the survival of actors in the 
system. These assumptions therefore reveal that the lack of a central authority 
combined with an egocentric human nature in the international system breeds 
conflict and struggle amongst nations. The strength of this argument is based on the 
evidence of struggle, conflict and power maximization socially, economically and 
politically in the international system due to a lack of central authority which might 
be said to have been a natural instinct in mankind. 
                                                          
10
 Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations 
Theory, (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1989),  pp. 15, 58. 
11
 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence, (Palmer Grave Press, 1987), p. 251. 
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In addition, realism claims that states are either defensive or they are offensive in 
their international relations towards each other. It can also be argued that the pursuit 
of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union and the USA during the Cold War era was 
either defensive or offensive realism or simply a combination of both. Therefore, 
while for Hobbes, realism answers a minority of questions in international relations, 
it still leaves the majority questions unanswered.
12
 It is important to define types of 
realism. First there is offensive realism which is a structure oriented school of 
thought proposed by neorealist such as John Mearsheimer.
13
 The theory views the 
anarchic structure of the global system as the main cause for aggression by states. It 
is based upon five main propositions which are: 
I. The main actors in the anarchical international system are the great powers 
II. All states in the system have military capabilities which are by nature 
offensive. 
III. States do not possess a total ability to know the intentions of others 
IV. The main goal of all states is survival 
V. All states are rational actors and they all have the capacity to craft policies 
aimed at maximizing their power in order to survive 
The major aim of offensive realism according to Mearsheimer is to recreate the 
„status quo‟ bias under defensive realism postulated by Kenneth Waltz. It is 
important to note that these two variants of neorealism agree on the idea that states 
are focused more of power and security maximization. The disagreement is about the 
types, levels and scope of power needed to achieve such a goal. Defensive realism 
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which shall be discussed in detail in the next section focuses on status quo power 
seeking to protect and maintain their positions by way of securing the already 
existing balance of power. On the other hand, offensive realism argues that states 
seek to revise the status quo and maximize their power through aggressive policies 
rather than just through passive defense policies. In addition, offensive realism 
argues that the global system incites great powers with appealing incentives such as 
control and influences in order to secure their survival and maintains their security.
14
  
 
The order of the day is one marked by an anarchical global system that is one which 
has an absence of a central regulatory authority to enforce laws and punish 
offenders.
15
 The high unpredictable and uncertainty in the intention of state actors as 
well as the presence of military capacities will result a perpetual state of fear and 
mistrust amongst states and hence they tend to rely on self-aiding mechanisms to 
ensure their survival. To offset this fear and unpredictability, states will end up 
maximizing their material power base relative to what other states are doing. 
Mearsheimer argues that states will always look for chances to alter the balance of 
power by way of incrementally adding their material power bases at the expense of 
their competitors. This happens because states believe that the more military 
capabilities they possess the more secure they would become over other states even 
at the detriment of other states in the global system as they aim for more hegemony 
in an anarchic system.  
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The best way for states to achieve this goal would be to have robust offensive 
policies provided that the policies are rational to the concerned state; they would 
even go on to purse expansionist strategies.  Since global hegemony is an impossible 
goal due to vast global space and limited resources, states focus more on achieving a 
regional type of hegemony thus establishing influence and control in their respective 
regions. The consistent need for more power and security creates more intense 
competition even reaching as far as going to war with would be opponents. After 
establishing regional hegemony, strong states seek to preserve the status quo.
16
 
 
However offensive realism‟s obsession with revisionist actors seems to go against 
the assumption that state intention is always uncertain when in reality it is certain 
that states seek to maximize power and challenge the status quo. Aggressive policies 
pursued by great powers in order to maximize their power actually leads to offensive 
or defensive justification by other states to counter such moves rather than irrational 
moves based on theoretical threats. The theory has also been challenged on its 
premise that states seek to have a geographical hegemony mainly because of limited 
resources and an inability to control vast global space. This limits offensive realism 
to a geographically limited proposition and not a system wide theory. Most great 
powers such as China seek to maximize influence beyond regional borders and they 
are not limited by oceans. In this case the failure to define what actually constitutes a 
region will result in analytical shortfalls in the theory as globalization erodes more 
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regions into one global community. An example in Europe North-East Asia which 
are vast regions interacting in a global system.
17
 
 
The second category of weakness falls under the scope of offensive realism. The 
failure of the theory to address domestic politics exposes the theory to serious 
limitations since no specific focus was given to a state‟s internal political culture in 
terms of its economy, religion, history and society preferences of which these play a 
significant role in decision making in all states which ultimately affects the state‟s 
behavior on the international stage.
18
 The narrow focus on state security alone 
ignores transactional opportunities such cooperation in international organizations 
and threats such as terrorism as major issue in determining a state‟s defensive or 
offensive strategies. States are also concerned about non-security interest such 
national unification in North Korean, political and economic ideology in the USA 
and human rights issues across European states as important sectors of their 
international relations. All these aspects are very important in gaining or maintain 
influence and control as they are regarded as soft power variables. These weaknesses 
affect the theory‟s empirical reliability and thus fall short as a sound and valid 
framework to use in understand international relations. The question of morality or 
ethics was dealt with mostly by Machiavelli who argued that morality has no place in 
international relations. His assumptions are applied to both domestic and 
international politics.
19
 Therefore whatever is good for the state must be justified and 
executed despite its breach of any moral standard, civilization or ethics. Immoral 
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policies are justified in the international system but at the same time did not reject 
that such actions are evil rather, evil is good. These assumptions entail that the 
highest moral value was the survival and the protection of the state by any means 
necessary or unnecessary and that securing, maintaining and promoting national 
power was a duty and right of the state.
20
   
 
Hans Morgenthau came up with other realist assumptions which try to explain 
international relations. International agreements are binding only when they are 
beneficial to the state but in essence they could be easily broken once they threaten 
the survival of the state.
21
 From this basis it can be argued that Machiavelli was 
pragmatic in explaining the events of the First and Second World War during 1914 
and 1945. This period was a combination of immorality in policies of war and 
struggle for power maximization. The weakness of this is that it was formulated 
during time of princes and kingdoms which is relatively outdated model in 
explaining the current international relations architecture. Even the most none 
democratic states still cooperate on liberal policies such as environmental 
cooperation and nuclear non-proliferation done by Russia, the USA, South Africa 
and India. State behavior should therefore be analyzed with a wider framework 
interpreting current dynamics of international relations. Hans Morgenthau is 
considered as an outstanding twentieth century figure in the field of international 
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politics. Morgenthau's publications fall under the tradition of political realism in 
international relations theory.
22
 
 
He came up with the “six principles of political realism” as stated in his book Politics 
among Nations.
23
 
These are: 
I. Politics, similarly to society, is administered through objective laws which 
are influenced by human nature. A nature which is eternal: hence it is 
plausible to develop a theory that reflects the presence of such objective laws. 
II. The main feature of political realism is the function of interest explained in 
terms of power. Political realism argues in favor of the rationality, objectivity 
and unemotional political and social behaviors. 
III. Realism claims that interest in terms of power is an objective categorization 
which is generally valid but not with a one size fit all meaning. Power should 
be seen therefore as the control and dominance of man over man. 
IV. Political realism recognizes the moral importance of any of political behavior. 
It is not blind to moralist as such but realism strikes a balance between moral 
demands and prudent political behavior. 
V. Political realism disregards the moral beliefs of a particular state with the 
moral laws that operate in the world. It argues that interest defined in terms of 
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power saves us from the excessiveness of morality excess and political 
foolishness. 
VI. The political realists maintain the independence of the political sphere. It is 
based on a universal notion of human nature.  
He argued that politics, just as in any has society, is governed by laws which are 
objectively rooted in human nature. In this regard, he attempts to argue that laws, in 
this case foreign policies, are formulated based on human nature which is egoistic 
and power centric. While he is aware of the effects of morality on political actions, 
he however declares that under realism the political interest of a nation is far more 
significant than universal morality of any given community in international relations. 
States therefore seek to follow a foreign policy agenda that is both state centric, 
maximizing benefits and minimizing risks. Morgenthau notes his second principle as 
simply the utility of power in international relations. He argues that power is the 
control of man over man. As man possess territories, resources and influence the one 
with more power ultimately controls the way of life in the polity.
24
 Power in this 
regard is defined in terms of political and military strength. Therefore, in discussing 
his ideas it can be argued that political leaders think and act in terms of power 
defined as political interest. Universal moral principles or in modern terms; 
international laws cannot be fully applied to the actions of states as they view 
morality as a threat to national interest.
25
 This conclusion is based on the premise that 
Morgenthau calls for a balance in political policy between the influences of morality 
and power as more prudent than any extreme end of the two. 
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Kenneth Waltz reformulated the assumptions of realism as a theory. In his book 
the Theory of International Politics 1979, he argued that countries in the global 
system are of similar fashion such as units of a state in a domestic structure and they 
have identical interests: Survival.
26
 In international politics the setup of the global 
political system is usually influenced by the notion that some countries would rather 
survive than seek controversial political goals based on a long term view because it 
will be more costly to go against the status quo thus they behave with the need to 
realize that goal by any means necessary. Waltz formulated structural realism 
whereby the international system originates from the association of states. Despite 
the differences in the characteristics and association of states there are close 
resemblance amongst states in the international system. Waltz notes that political 
organizations are formulated by their ideologies, functions and the distribution of 
abilities. This defines how states are related to each other as units in the system, and 
how functions are allocated which ultimately determines how power is allocated. 
 
Waltz formulated defensive realism a sub theory of realism. The theory maintains 
that the anarchical nature of the global system incentives states to pursue moderately 
well thought policies which are by nature reserved and passive to realize their 
security. Aggressive and expansionist policies tend to offset the balance of power 
and this reduced that main objective of states that is to ensure security.
27
 The 
incentives for states to become offensive and the possibility of interstate 
confrontation are real but these conditions are isolated and limited. States are not 
aggressive by nature and their first priority is not aggression but the maximizing of 
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power. This is because states which seek to establish hegemony in the global system 
are naturally confronted by opponents trying to maintain the balance of power and 
the status quo. 
 
States are aware of the costs of aggression and thus aggression becomes self-
defeating in order to have more security which is the main aim of states. Aggression 
is rather not rewarded but punished. The advantages of expansion are limited 
compared to the costs. The costs include resistance from the forces of nationalism 
making military invasion very difficult and an expensive undertaking.
28
 The 
economic rewards of invasion are limited and the economic cost can be felt also on 
the invader. It is critical to show the difference between men in the state of nature 
and states in an anarchical system. The former side is more vulnerable to attack and 
they can easily be defeated and conquered as opposed to the latter side where states 
are not that vulnerable since the annihilation is a very challenging and long task to 
undertake. States prefer to wait for sound proof of threats rather than carry out series 
of random pre-emptive attacks to offset hypothetical threats thus reducing the 
security dilemma. 
 
The concept of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) implies that states cannot be 
easily conquered as they have an ability unitarily to respond to the aggression or in 
association with others. Global anarchy becomes relatively insignificant and states 
are more inclined to defend rather than offend since states may secure their territories 
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without risking the security of other players. Defensive realism still admits that 
opportunities to expand exist and that states can still exploit them if they seek to.
29
 
Defensive realism addresses an important aspect of domestic politics ignored by 
offensive realism. The theory claims that the perceptions of the elite in a state 
determine the international relations policy of the state.
30
 The perceptions of the elite 
modify the structure of the international system according to the concerned elites and 
this usually offsets the balance of power. Perceptions can be true or false but they are 
expressed in several ways sometimes in unusual way which might be offensive to 
other actors. Each state has elites governing various sectors who influence the 
direction of the state overall foreign policy. These elites can be in the fields of 
politics, economics, religious and military elites. A worst-case scenario is the 
military elite influencing the foreign policy of a state. This is usually followed by 
expansionist policies. They tend to design the grand strategy which may last for 
decades and might be hard to reverse once implemented. An example is the Japanese 
Empire desire to expand and conquer surrounding territories including China 
province of Manchuria from the mid-1930s and ultimate leading to its collapse. 
31
 
 
The order of the international system is organized through the principal of anarchy 
and hierarchy. As a result, states either operate in authority and subordination based 
relationships or they operate in total disorder. The similarity in the behavior of nation 
states over years can be argued to have been caused by the limitations on their 
behavior imposed by the structures of the global system. The international system is 
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defined by the principles (economic or political) on which it is built.
32
 Waltz 
recognizes the presence of non-state actors such as non-governmental organizations 
and multinational companies, but regards them as significantly unimportant. The 
central assumption under structural realism is that state „balance‟ is the ideal solution 
to the problem of anarchy. Weaker nations tend to have no option but to team up 
with the strong in exchange for favorable treatment. Internal balances are achieved 
by way of reallocation of state resources toward state security measures and 
externally balancing by forming associations through official or unofficial treaties or 
agreements. A case in point is that of the USSR and the USA relations during the 
Cold War. USA opposed the revolution in Russia for over twenty years. However, 
the rise of Nazi Germany under Hitler created a common enemy which saw the 
formation of the USSR and the USA relations during the Second World War. This 
was despite their differences in history, culture, political organization and goals. The 
end of the Cold War restored the USSR and the USA hostility and they became 
opponents. Waltz concluded that at least, states seek to preserve themselves and at 
most, they seek to have maximum domination. 
 
Since all states place survival on the core of their policies, anarchy is generated as 
the states regard the structure as a self-help system in which individual states have to 
take care of themselves. Ultimately their roles and influence are based on the 
capabilities of each state.
33
 The strength of these assumptions is based on the utility 
of power, units and capabilities in relation to state behavior. The role played by the 
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state is determined by the number of units or states influencing it. It can also be 
argued that states with greater capabilities tend to seek more power and the desire to 
influence more units in the international system in an attempt to survive or dominate.  
 
However the view of non-state actors as insignificant tends to undermine a clear 
view of the nature and structure of the international system.
34
 Though morality has a 
selective application under realism, it is generally agreed to date that international 
laws and liberalism has a far reaching influence on states as evidence by the UN 
Charter of 1945, several international treaties such a the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
and additional protocols and Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty of 1968.
35
 Realism 
has its short comings and a full application might have inaccurate conclusions about 
states. The theory has limited reference on morality and focuses mostly on self-
interest. The theory assumes that a state does not respect morality and is solely self-
serving against other international laws. This is in fact inaccurate as states can 
cooperate with international organizations with the regards to nuclear regulation and 
inspections.
36
 Due to the shortfalls in theoretic assumptions of some realist ideas, 
scholars also looked at the works for Edward Hallett Carr. In his book, The Twenty 
Years' Crisis, Carr seeks to explain the nature and relationship of power, politics and 
morality in international relations.
37
 Man prefers association rather than isolation by 
their very nature of being rational beings. They form various groups to control or 
regulate the activities of the whole clan and its members. As a result, politics is the 
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association of men in a given polity to achieve a desire goal which is security.
38
 The 
relationship is one characterized by authority, influence and power of the members 
upon each other developed through historical and shared social values. When this 
concept is applied to states as main actors in international relations it becomes clear 
that the role of states is to regulate their territory as they please in order to determine 
their position in the global system. Carr is of the view that state politics should be 
understood from the nature of man as individuals. Aristotle concluded very well that 
a man is a political animal. 
 
As political animals, men tend to show various characteristics towards his fellows in 
two contradictory manners.
39
 At one point man expresses greed by way of imposing 
his will on others even against their wishes. This egoistic character can be regarded 
as inborn and natural. On the other side, men express love or fear which can be seen 
in the form of socialization that is entering into various social and political 
communities to interact on areas of shared interests. In the form of fear, men tend to 
exhibit compliance tendencies towards authority.
40
 Thus societies form and break 
based on these two emotions. Since the two emotions are sometimes contradictory, 
there is need to have some form of punitive measures or punishment exercised on the 
group by a central figure is needed to ensure maximum cooperation. This does not 
mean that punishment is the only solution to the balancing of interests but also 
rewards and incentives can be offered for good behavior. Since membership is 
usually voluntary in nature, the most effective way of punishing offenders is by way 
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of expelling them out of the community or social contract. This is different from the 
global system whereby states are members and their membership seems to be 
compulsory in nature. States are thus joined by shared interests and obligations. 
 
However, it is not always the case that states cooperate in the international system 
due to opposing emotions in play. In order to avoid anarchy, the stronger within the 
system will resort to coercive measures to regulate the conduct of member states and 
establish loyalty to the principles of the international system. While this approach 
seems, feasible It is not practical since states just like men tend to resist coercion 
especially when there are opposing interest. Loyalty to the system will now be 
enforced by punitive measure of the stronger upon the weaker and international 
civilization is now being held through greed and not love. Thus in every community 
there are weaker groups versus the stronger groups cooperating through coercion or 
self-subordination. Basing on these assertions Carr is of the view that society is 
formed upon two foundational thoughts one that is utopian and another that is 
realistic.
41
 In these two types of thoughts, power and morality are the key 
determinants of state behavior.   
 
Utopianism is characterized by those who seek to remove self-determination form 
political systems while using values and morality as the social glue tying political 
system together. On the other hand, the realistic side rejects this notion and claims 
that an ideal society does not exist and that all state behavior is derived from power 
and self-interest with little to no consideration of morality. Therefore, politics to the 
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realist becomes the exercise of power and self-assertion so without power there is no 
politics while to the utopian it is the exercise of values and moral principles in 
political associations and so without moral consideration there is no true political 
participation.
42
 The use power at the expense of morality is self-defeating 
nevertheless disregarding power in favor of morality is unsustainable. A far more 
reasonable and preferable approach would be a balance between power and morality. 
The fall of Hitler‟s Germany is a classic example of the adverse effects of power of 
morality wherein millions where dragged into a catastrophic war killing millions of 
people during the Second World War. The Assembly in Germany led to the breakup 
of the Weimar Republic as it pursues idealist politics separated from the use of 
power to implement domestic policies in 1848.
43
  
 
Carr defines power in simple terms as the capability to enforce or achieve a desired 
goal. In international relations power is categorized into political power, economic 
power, military power and social power.
44
 These aspects of power are all related in 
reality but for the sake of discussion they can be broken into small concepts. States 
possess most of all these types of power relative to each other. Political power is the 
use of political positions to achieve desired goals. This type of power is mostly in an 
administrative capacity and is derived from constitutes through a popular vote or by 
appointment. An example of political power by popular vote is the election of leaders 
in democratic states such as the USA, Turkey and South Africa be it presidential 
power or parliamentary power. Political power in the form of administrative 
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appointments included the delegation of state authority upon individuals to act on 
behalf of a state such as the appointment of diplomats to carry out a state‟s foreign 
policy. Economic power is the use of monetary and fiscal instruments to achieve a 
goal. Elements of state economic power includes the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
interest rates, value of currency, scope of international trade, employment base and 
development capabilities all regulated by a central bank in the concerned state.
45
 The 
USA is regarded a superpower not only because of its political and military might 
but also its economic capabilities. 
 
Military power is hard type of power which characterized by the use of army and 
military arsenal to achieve strategic goals. This included the number of foot soldiers, 
fighter jets and nuclear weapons a state has as well as other conventional weapons. 
China and Russia are relatively big powers military because of their military 
capacities in relation to other states in the international system. Lastly but not least is 
social power that is the use of social values, culture and religion to affect a desire 
outcome on the international stage.
46
 This types of soft power stretches as far as 
languages and civilization dominance.
47
 The Britain has a remarkable social power in 
the international system through its widely-accepted language and culture by mostly 
former colonies of the former British Empire. States tend to maximize their power in 
these for spheres of influence that is political, economic, military and social. In order 
of important, the realist regards military and political power as more significant to 
states. However, there is rarely any political or military power without economic and 
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social power through which states are formed. It is important to under types of power 
in international relation since is through these capabilities that states exercise their 
will and achieves their goals in the form of national interests. Carr provides a broad 
framework upon which international relations can be more understood from a realist 
perspective as he takes into account a lot of important variables neglected by other 
realists. 
 
1.2 Constructivism  
The International relations field after the Cold War provides more dynamic 
approaches in understanding world politics. The theory of constructivism is one of 
the paradigms offering an advanced development of international relations security 
theories. The founding fathers include Nicholas Onuf  and Richard Ashley. 
Alexander Wendt regarded as one of the core constructivist scholar argued that 
constructivism can be argued to be a form of structural idealism.
48
 Constructivism is 
not necessarily an in international relations theory rather it is society oriented 
approach that gives an understanding in the interpretation of the dynamics in world 
politics from a social construction perspective that is on how the state actors are 
constructed internally.
49
 This section attempts to discuss the basic assumptions and 
concepts of constructivism and how the theory relates to modern international 
politics. A complex international system requires a complex theoretical framework to 
understand. Constructivism attempts to project itself to be a theory that can answer 
such a demand. Constructive is a sociology theory of global politics that stresses that 
the international system is socially constructed through values and cultures 
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embedded in human nature by way of history and civilizations.
50
 Therefore in order 
to understand state behavior in international relations one has to comprehend the 
social identities that make up a state. The theory attempts to view state conduct 
through state characteristics such as religious norms and cultures and languages that 
shapes the social fabric and mental processes of its inhabitants. States are unique and 
they have core units that define a state‟s political, social, economic and military 
policies on the domestic and international stage. The USA has a unique international 
policy different from Russia‟s foreign policy character. Thus, the Cold War was a 
byproduct of the inevitable clashes of these deeply entrenched opposing identities. 
While realist also focuses on state characteristics, the constructivism goes a sate 
further to identify how policies are formed from bottom up rather than top to bottom 
as claimed by classical realists. 
 
The culmination of the Cold War elevated the notion of constructivism in security 
debates in international theory field. Under constructivism, anarchy and the unequal 
distribution of military capabilities do not determine a state‟s identity and its 
relations with others. A strong military capacity of a country can be perceived as a 
menacing power or protecting capability by other states.
51
 Does this then mean that a 
state‟s military structure becomes a menacing status by pursing nuclear weapons? If 
the acquisition of nuclear weapons is mainly for military prestige why is it that 
regimes call for civilian nuclear energy? This view seems to be half true while it can 
be argued that the military has an important need to be menacing, it is also untrue 
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that one sector of the government determines the defense policy of a nation. For 
instance, in modern Pakistan the parliament as well as the presidential office play 
important roles in defense policy. For instance, the USA Nuclear weapons capability 
is perceived differently by Taiwan as compared to a nuclear weapons program in the 
hands of China.
52
 Thus by investigating the military structures, goals and capabilities 
of North Korea or India and its regional peers one can conclude that, states seek to 
maximize power in relation to the regional and international military status of other 
states. State`s political identities such as governance models and its social structures 
are also important factors that determine the type and quality of relations among 
states. North Korea‟s social structure has an overwhelming patriotic populace that is 
very supportive of the government‟s policies lead by Kim Jong-un since 2011.  
 
Similar political identities such as governance structures and long-history of 
cooperation between two or more states, for instance, can be a basis upon which 
cooperative security system are established; but distinct political identities and long-
history of tension can result in the construction of a competitive international 
security system. Countries cooperate in nuclear programs based on their governance 
structures, goals and history. It might be argued that Iran‟s nuclear cooperation with 
Russia and North Korea in terms of expertise, machinery and equipment is a direct 
result of similar constructive structures.
53
 As opposed to neorealism which bases 
basis its claims on the dominance of material power both economic and military, and 
neoliberal institutionalism which accepts a relatively narrow influence and role of 
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non-material powers in international relations, constructivism gives top priority to 
the significance of a state`s sources of power.
54
 In the same manner the discursive 
power of the USA should be determined by ideas, culture as well as material power. 
What determines the nuclear policy of the USA is very much influenced by these 
notions. The USA‟s economic status backed by a sound economic industry is very 
much capable of favoring nuclear programs. However how does culture and history 
contribute towards USA‟s defense policy? A closer clue might be a culture of high 
national esteem and values is more defensive and protective than a culture with less 
regard to its values. 
 
These factors and influences through states interact to construct the international 
system. Discursive power operates by creating and producing subjective perceptions. 
It aids in explaining how the material structure, international events, states‟ political 
identity, relations between or among states, and any other social relations should be 
described and understood.
55
 With discursive power, the same material expression can 
be manipulated to produce certain interpretation and weaken alternative meanings. A 
typical example is that the USA due to its discursive power is able to present unique 
interpretations for Pakistan nuclear position and North Korea‟s nuclear weapons 
programs.
56
 These political and security issues are not a result of material power 
alone or its distribution but they are a result of a construction through the USA`s 
discursive power. Therefore, the USA through its discursive power might perceive 
the acquisition of nuclear weapons as beneficial, moral and necessary to its national 
                                                          
54
 Scott  Sagan, The Causes of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation, (Stanford; Stanford University, 
California; 2008), pp. 81-82. 
55
 Sagan, The Causes of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation, pp. 89-90. 
56
 Steven Miller, Scott Sagan, „Nuclear power without nuclear proliferation?” Daedalus Security 
Review, 138, (2009), p. 4. 
 
34 
 
 
  
survival. 
 
The possibility of a monopolistic or a cooperative global security system challenges 
the significance of the balance of power concept in international politics. This is 
because according to constructivism the material power of other states does not by 
default imply the presence of military threats, at the same time the theory claims that 
it is not necessary to assume that every increment in material power of other states 
must be met by a balance in power.
57
 The concept of balance of power can be 
substituted with that of the balance of threats. This means that what a state should 
balance is a menacing military power and not balancing a state that does not threaten 
other states with its military power. However, what categorizes a state as a threat is 
largely dependent on the governance type and role identities that a state has. 
International norms, values, practices and institutions are also constructed through 
socio-political interactions, and these also determine the roles, identities and 
meanings that a state can refer to in terms of categorization of state actors. 
 
In summary, constructivism advances the view that most aspects of international 
politics are constructed by history and society, rather than by the unavoidable effects 
of human nature or other significant features of international politics. Constructivism 
is contrary to claims made by neoliberalism and neorealism by proving that 
important aspects of international relations are a product of social construction and 
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that they originate from the continuous processes of social interaction and practice.
58
 
There are two basic features of constructivism, first that the systems of human 
association depend largely on shared ideas and culture rather than material external 
forces, and that the positions and goals of different actors are a product of these 
established ideas and not by their given nature.
59
 Thus majority of people in different 
countries regard access to nuclear energy, facilities and capability as their legitimate 
national right. These nationalist stances are usually harnessed by populist 
governments in power through political or social tools such as propaganda and 
religion.
60
 Thus, militarization of nuclear programs and nuclear saber rattling is a 
propaganda instrument employed by the leadership as a way of arousing domestic 
and regional public support and sympathy.
61
 To further understand the connection 
between nationalist populist policies, one can note that states acquire strategic 
nuclear supremacy as this is important for the their domestic, regional and 
international agendas, as it would enable the concerned state to enhance its capacity, 
influence and power across the region in spite of security differences with various 
other states.
62
 
 
At the local level of constructivism then, nuclear programs have been, to a significant 
extent, influenced by forces of national pride and identity.
63
 However, the emphasis 
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of domestic constructivist assumptions emphasizing nationalism finds its way up to 
the international level: a state`s bitterness and victimization in foreign policy can be 
argued to be a result of long ill-treatment by other powers. Thus, there is a legitimate 
frustration with what states perceive as security double standard in the nuclear policy 
that would maintain their enemy‟s strategic dominance and supremacy but deny 
nuclear capability and facilities to other states as regional powers. From this 
discussion, ideological reasons far outweigh strategic goals in motivating a state in 
pursuing a nuclear program, and propaganda policies.
64
 Realist models that place a 
premium on external forces alone and strategic regional insecurity of states do not 
stand up to the ability to fully explain a state`s nuclear ambitions. Fears of 
superpower biasness have been increased by the culture of weak state victimization, 
and the aggressive sense of superpower nuclear policies that has dominated the 
nuclear relations of states. This results in weaker states seeking deterrence or 
defensive capabilities. Furthermore, with military nuclearization usually perceived as 
a symbol of national pride, the nuclear program of a state draws popular support in 
constructivist theories, rather than regional strategic explanations.  
 
In North Korea, nuclear decision-making capacities is concentrated in the hand of 
ruling elite and military officers, the nuclear program might enable the government 
to increase its self-identity as a regional power of some sort.
65
 Though strategic 
interests may have initially propelled the nuclear programs, and offer foreign policy 
justifications vis-à-vis deterrence of the USA, powerful constructivist motivations, 
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taken advantage of by the regime currently governing, may have been the central 
reasons behind the North Korean nuclear policy. The regime is perceived to be 
radical by the west because of its many violations of the Nuclear Proliferation 
Treaty. It is still not enough to base assumptions on these factors alone. A more 
detailed debate will have to be executed in line with other relevant theories. 
 
1.3 The Copenhagen Approach 
The Copenhagen theory is regarded as relatively successful in modeling a political 
framework that has attracted a lot of attention in the field of international politics, as 
shown by the vast number of literature concentrating on its central assumptions of 
„security‟ or some variation of it.66 Security in international relations has been useful 
in discussing a state`s foreign policy model. The question of security is not a new 
phenomenon in international relations. In addition, the classical concept of security 
was orientated towards the state as the major referent. The theories of security all 
have various meanings on what should be protected or secured. Realism stresses the 
importance of the state a main unit to be securitized and protected from internal and 
external threats. However, the realists face criticism by other schools because the 
associate security as an offshoot of power thus minimizing the complex concept of 
security to just a mere identification with power. Security should not just be regarded 
as a state centric concept but should include all other elements with the state such a 
regime, civic organizations, the environment and human security.
67
 The concept of 
security as a limited field and one that had to be broadened beyond the scope of just 
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military centered.
68
 Buzan therefore went further to elaborate the concept offering a 
more comprehensive view. This new approach incorporated perceptions that were 
not subsequently regarded to be part of the security nexus for instance notions of 
regional security, sociological and environmental subdivisions of security.  
 
1.3.1 Levels of Security: States, Individuals and International Systems  
It is significant to start by noting that there was a wide gap in the writing and 
publication of security as a concept. For a matter that seems to be recently on the 
public‟s mind, the advance to security and the particulars of the problem has been 
largely left vacant. Maybe this can explain why international security interpretations 
and analysis has been narrow prior to the Cold War. Barry Buzan sets out to fill this 
space and allocated security as an approach for international relations, as it is such an 
essential concept, the method of mapping it certainly takes great effort and insight.
69
 
Buzan‟s examination can be measured to be a loose bonding of neo-realism and the 
constructivism theory, mostly supporting constructivism. The international society as 
a social structure approach attempts to reveal the dynamics and engines or factors 
behind the international system rather than purse a plural or unitary method of 
analysis mostly found in realists and idealists.  
 
Basing on this foundation, the differences with neorealism occurs, because realist 
definition of security as being a wholesome contest for power is outmoded, resulting 
in a myopic world view, and this only hinders the strategy makers or international 
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relations academics in coming to an inclusive understanding of the topic.  As an 
alternative approach, Buzan discusses security offering three levels of analysis and 
five sections of security. This systematic flow originates in the English school of 
international relations and extends into aspects the Copenhagen theory.
70
 The English 
school of international relations emphasizes the aspect of societies of states at the 
global level despite the presence of anarchy.
71
 These societies operate through ideas 
rather than just material capacities and it is these ideas that shape the behavior of 
states in the system.  The theory becomes associated with both constructivism on the 
social units of analysis and also with Copenhagen in regards to the types of ideas and 
sectors upon which states seek cooperation on. Security can be viewed on individual, 
state and international system level. This is then balanced by offering five sections of 
security which are environment based, economic issues, and politics based issues, 
societal and lastly military issues.
72
 The perceptions offered might not sufficiently 
deal with the question of security separately; they are each related creating a network 
in sequence that political experts should untangle to comprehend all the concepts so 
as to grasp how the notions influence each other in total. This narrow and broad style 
is something complex but is important in order to understand the depth of security. In 
the first level of analysis focusing on the individual, in order to fulfill this intricate 
study of security in which the state is assumed as the core referent, a question has to 
be asked with regards to the nature of a state when explaining security in terms of 
individuals, it can be argued that security may be measured as an aspect of life and 
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its relative facets of freedom, status, wealth and health.
73
  
 
Threat as a concept can be understood on an individual level. As stated, the concept 
of security is not a narrow model, because individual security and national security 
are two different but related notions. Therefore, one can reflect on the character of 
the state in attempting to realize the security of larger and more vague units are 
nebulous in nature. A closer look at the nature of these elements one can tell that they 
can be turned into security related inquiries. By therefore studying them the broader 
picture of national security can be revealed in a more elaborative manner. The 
establishment of the interrelated network will help in coming up with answers to 
national defense policies. 
 
1.3.2 Five security sectors 
In order to understand the operation of the international system, a five-sector security 
model has been formed to act as a framework in the interpretation of global 
politics.
74
 The military, political, economic, environmental, regional and societal 
sectors affect the periphery due to the changes at the center. What is of paramount 
importance is to realize that the five sections should not be investigated in a 
separated manner and they do not work in sole. Each sector describes a central point 
and helps to order priorities security issues. A more interesting argument is the link 
between the sectors and the concept of threats. 
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1.3.3 Environmental, Economic and Societal Securities 
The ecological, economic and societal sectors accompany the political and military 
securities and are more difficult to define. Threats of an economic nature are more 
challenging to study because of the complicated aspects of economics. The normal 
conditions portrayed by actors in a market based economy is one of danger, 
aggressive competition as well as vagueness, this apprehensive environment makes 
economic security tough to straighten out and how this ultimately affects 
international relations.
75
 The economic sector is also a clear illustration of how the 
dissimilar sectors work together with one another the significant relationship 
between economic and military securities. It is straightforward to see that they 
military sector is reliant on the economic sector due do budget limitations. In 
addition, economic security can be deemed to be a key pointer as to the universal 
security of a state. A comparison of developed or core countries and the developing 
periphery countries shows that where there is economic security, other sectors of 
security are relatively easier to develop. Hence a nation`s economic security may 
determine its political and military policies in international relations. 
 
Social securities are one of the most valued of all the other five segments of security. 
Disconnecting social security from political security is less academic since threats of 
a social nature are mostly linked to issues of national identity in any given nation.
76
 
Delicate countries are frequently less prepared to deal with differences in national 
identities and customs as opposed to strong states that have a strong identity and 
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culture. Societal perceptions including religious beliefs and nationalism therefore 
impact on type of government, policies and ultimately influencing a nation`s foreign 
policy. It is evident that social related security matters are highly related to the 
politics as well as the military segments of security. The majority of international 
conflicts across the globe are mostly the ones with a societal category.
77
 Conflicts 
were bound to happen due to differences in culture and civilizations which in turn 
determine threats, vulnerabilities and foes and allies.
78
 
 
It is consequently important to have more attention on these areas and put them into 
the study of security especially on global level. Nevertheless, due to differences of 
civilizations, the concept of social security might not be simple to put into 
investigation without running the risk of being critically one-sided. This can simply 
guide researchers and policy makers into political prejudgment and exclusion. The 
environment based security aspects are complicated to define and might be regarded 
as very elusive when compared to the other five segments. The threats facing humans 
today as a result of changes in the environment pose a real danger to the lives of a 
society.
79
 These threats range from global warming to the ruin of the ozone layer 
have led to alternative solutions that might be perceived as threats by other actors in 
the international system such as nuclear energy.
80
All sections must be taken into 
account when examining domestic and global security, both in isolation and 
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collectively. 
 
1.3.4 Regional Security 
The conception of regional security was not sufficiently dealt with before Buzan. 
When investigating this aspect of security. Buzan is of the view that, security is a 
relative occurrence.
81
 Since security is relative, one cannot recognize the domestic 
security of a state without comprehending the international model of security 
dependence. There is friendship and hostility among states, thus relationships 
between states is determined by alliances or simply by anxiety. The subjects that can 
disturb a state`s regional position in terms of policy range from issues such as 
national ideology, territorial identity, ethnicity, and history. Security complexes can 
be helpful in policy analysis and they also present an ideal framework to confer 
issues that are prevalent to a specific area. Possibly the most tremendous can be that 
of Israel and Arab nations. Israel and the Middle East security complex shows 
Israel‟s safety is connected to its regional position that is the Middle East. The 
opposite is also true, and in the end both sides take this complex into consideration 
when determining their national security policies. Regional security is an element of 
the hierarchy of the security dilemma, settled somewhere between domestic and 
worldwide security thus and cannot be left out of the equation.
 82
 
 
A state‟s regional security is closely related to its position geographically and 
whether it perceives regional players as allies of foes. The aspect of security that 
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could have determined the USA‟s a regional position in terms of policy ranges from 
issues such as nuclear policy, national ideology, territorial identity, ethnicity, and 
historical pattern.
83
 Regional security in terms of economic conditions might have 
contributed to need for nuclear program in some states as the region is one marked 
with under development and civil wars. A nuclear program offers massive 
opportunities economically such as jobs, developmental boost and more trade 
opportunities. Regional insecurity in terms of military threats has also a side effect 
on countries.
84
 Nuclear weapons programs offers a security deterrent that protects a 
state in cases of attacks which could be one of the reasons why the state has a nuclear 
program however such a capability might be perceived hostile by other states hence 
becoming a security threat in the region.
85
 The former aspect includes issues to do 
with technical capabilities in relation to the supply of nuclear materials and 
equipment. On the other hand, the nation need to have a nuclear program is 
categorized under the demand side of nuclear proliferation. 
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  CHAPTER II 
SUPPLY AND DEMAND ON NUCLEAR PROGRAMS 
2.1 Nuclear proliferation 
The world is more alert to the spread of nuclear weapons than ever before. Iran was 
accused of likely pursuing a nuclear weapon but the reasons for such a motivation 
are hardly known if ever stated. Having been placed under the UNSC, Iran continues 
its argument that is does not seek a nuclear bomb. Rather Iran claims to be following 
the program for civilian motives to generate electricity and control global warming. 
The relationship between civilian nuclear power and military weapons is not quite 
clear.
86
 Academics have increased their interest in understanding motivations for a 
nuclear program. The former aspect includes issues to do with technical capabilities 
in relation to the supply of nuclear materials and equipment. On the other hand, a 
nation need to have a nuclear program under the demand side of nuclear 
proliferation.
 87
 
 
2.2 Background on Nuclear Programs 
As from 1945 to 2016, nuclear programs initiated by states steadily rose although the 
increase was somehow slow. During that period, about one new atomic weapons 
state arose at the turn of every five years with the exception of South Africa and 
three former Soviet states that inherited the weapons. These exceptions did not 
develop operative technical competences.
88
 There is no disagreement about which 
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states pursued nuclear weapons but there are debates about when exactly did some 
states initiate their weapons program. These states are North Korea, Israel, Pakistan 
and India. The major challenge is to identify when a state is pursuing a nuclear 
weapons program, or at least planning to execute such a program since states possess 
sovereignty over their territories thus nuclear development programs may easily be 
concealed.
89
 Hence it is crucial to investigate why some states seek a nuclear 
weapons program.  
 
Soon after the end of the World War II there was a balance of power between the 
West and Eastern bloc and this help in avoiding the use of nuclear bombs. The result 
was the adoption of strategies arising out of fear during the Cold War. This became 
popularly known as the Mutually Assured Destruction Doctrine (MADD).
90
 This 
balance of power was very important in that it led to the signing of the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Treaty (ABMT) in 1972 between the USSR and the USA to prevent further 
research and production of such missiles capable of transmitting a nuclear bomb. The 
MADD principle led to nuclear proliferation as both side aimed at increasing its 
stock pile to make sure that they had the capacity to defeat their opponent in any 
given situation. 
 
During the Cold War, several lesser powers started to purse nuclear weapons for 
reasons not related to the USA, Soviet Union and Chinese antagonism. In 1962 India 
advance the research and development of nuclear weapons after the border conflict 
with the Chinese. In 1974 India tested a nuclear device described as peaceful 
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explosion.
91
 As a result Pakistan was provoked by the India nuclear program and 
they launched a nuclear research scheme. The two countries went on to test several 
nuclear devices in the late 1980s which caused the international community assume 
that a nuclear war was imminent between the two countries. 
 
In 1996 former Soviet bloc states, such as Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan 
submitted their nuclear warheads to Russia.
92
 South Africa developed a uranium 
program to develop nuclear weapons only to halt the scheme in the early 1990s. It is 
not clear if South Africa tested nuclear devices but the state noted that they had 
manufactured some devices with nuclear capability. Israel is alleged to have a 
nuclear arsenal with hundreds of atomic warheads. The only challenge is this 
allegation has not been refuted or confirmed officially. North Korea made it official 
in 2003 that they had a number of nuclear weapons devices and this announcement 
was met with doubts. However, in 2006 North Korea went on to test the first nuclear 
weapon violating the UNSCR 1718.
93
 Therefore it can be noted that the nuclear 
program is not unique to Iran but several other states had an active interest in 
pursuing nuclear weapons. 
 
2.3 The Supply-Side Literature on Nuclear Programs 
What kind of information can be used to assess if a state is capable of developing a 
nuclear weapons program? Researchers can use guideline to determine a state‟s 
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nuclear ambitions.
94
 Nuclear proliferation experts utilize Meyer‟s (1984) ground-
breaking work The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation and Stoll‟s (1996).95 Meyer 
(1984) came up with a set of ten mechanical based and financial orientated 
indicators.
96
 These can be summarized as the domestic mining conditions, presence 
of locally sourced uranium deposits, and availability of metallurgy experts, steel 
manufacturing industry, construction teams, biochemical experts and skilled 
physicists to determine whether a nation had latent capacity to produce nuclear 
weapons.  This work might explain why states such as Iran pursue nuclear weapons. 
 
 
It remained challenging to assess whether the availability of nuclear engineers as 
well as nuclear related materials could determine if a state was capable of forming a 
nuclear weapon. Meyer introduced two more standards to deal with this gap: First by 
checking if the government was working on a nuclear research program for periods 
up to three years and this would be a substitute for the atomic expert skills. Secondly 
if a state had mass production of vehicles and factory manufactured radios or 
televisions; this substituted the skills needed for explosive making and electrical 
engineering as such a country had a capacity to deliver that already. Using this 
standard Meyer concluded that about 34 states had the capability to initiate and 
develop nuclear weapons in 1982. 
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Stoll introduced a new element in the standard of analysis while Meyer had focused 
on locally sourced uranium bases. All states had access to nuclear resources stating 
that all states had access to nuclear materials in an international marketplace and 
those could be obtained easily.
97
 Based on such notions Stoll noted that 48 nations 
have a dormant nuclear capacity. A regime might not produce a nuclear weapon 
unless is has highly enriched uranium obtained from its own local reactors.
98
 Thus 
even if any state might obtain nuclear materials, a few can actually enrich the 
uranium into weapons grade materials. Therefore, Stoll‟s conclusions are 
fundamentally inconsistent with this mechanical restriction. 
 
In short by focusing on the supply side literature one can tell that a state‟s desire to 
have a nuclear bomb is related to the supply of nuclear materials and technical 
expertise needed to manufacture the bomb. This determines if a country has a 
mechanical capacity to develop a bomb. The broader question is not about why so 
many nuclear capable states did not produce weapons but rather why few states have 
developed or showed an interest in setting up nuclear facilities and machinery 
required to enrich uranium and the recycling of plutonium. It is worthwhile to note 
that nuclear proliferation is associated with availability of capital and avenues of 
trade allowed under international commerce.  
 
The spread of nuclear weapon is strongly tied with the supply of technology and 
materials. Nuclear trade offers both materials technology. Global supply of nuclear 
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related support aids in fast-tracking the spread of nuclear weapons.
99
 Kroenig 
describes such nuclear support to be aid of a structural and sensitive nature by allies 
providing a potential nuclear state with nuclear ingredients that will be used to 
manufacture the weapons. Three states that produced nuclear weapons after being 
offered nuclear support and resources from allies are Pakistan, China and Israel.
100
 
 
Kroenig discovers that international nuclear assistance can be associated with the 
development of nuclear programs by a state and the support can be in the form of 
technical or financial resources.
101
 This is further supported by the state‟s gross 
national product, industrial base of the state and the type of regime undertaking the 
nuclear programs. A new question emerges as to why would states trade or offer 
sensitive nuclear assistance to other states given the fact that this would without 
doubt allow for the spread of nuclear weapons. Most experts tend to conclude that 
national interest fosters unity amongst allies and most regimes do this for the 
monetary benefits as a trading strategy. This is usually the case notwithstanding, the 
expected proliferation costs. Governments such as Russia and Iran which are allies 
are also more likely to offer complex nuclear technology or support to other regimes 
where the perceived opponents of the assisted regime are also regarded as foes of the 
supporting regime. The conclusion of such states might be that the perceived foes of 
their foes might be a good customer. The spread of all kinds of civilian nuclear 
equipment contributes to overall nuclear advancement.
102
 Fuhrmann argues that: the 
traditional understanding is rather incorrect since all types of civilian nuclear aid will 
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by default raise the risk of nuclear proliferation. Peaceful nuclear programs and the 
militarization of nuclear weapons are usually interrelated since it takes almost the 
same skills and equipment to enrich uranium.  
 
According to Fuhrmann, the majority of nations that have openly declared civilian 
nuclear assistance and programs have not manufactured weapons.
103
 However, he 
notes that there is a strong relationship between the number of nuclear collaboration 
arrangements (NCAs) and the prospect that a state might end up initiating a nuclear 
weapons program ultimately developing a bomb. Nuclear collaboration highly 
determines if a state will pursue a nuclear weapons program or not. A state 
participating in one or more nuclear cooperation arrangement has a 500% likelihood 
of developing a bomb. Fuhrmann‟s fundamental argument that a regime may start on 
a civilian nuclear program but then turn towards the militarization of nuclear 
materials when regional threats appear is an important one.
104
 The debate is around 
NCAs which might end up inspiring state into nuclear research and exploration. Does 
this therefore mean that NCAs are catalysts in nuclear proliferation? While NCAs 
might encourage states to look into nuclear programs, it takes more than just NCAs 
for a start to be interested in the militarization of nuclear materials.  
 
There is a relation between NCAs and actual nuclear programs carried out by a state. 
India, Israel and Pakistan openly confirmed that they had received considerable 
nuclear assistance after they were already investigating nuclear programs.
105
 In this 
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case NCAs acted as catalysts speeding up an already existing program. North Korea 
on the other hand got support from Russia the then former Soviet Union at the same 
time the state started exploring nuclear materials.
106
 Out of these states only South 
Africa got assistance before it showed any interest in nuclear weapons in 1969. This 
support was granted in the mid-1950s just before the NPT system was founded.
107
  
 
2.4 The Demand-Side Literature on Nuclear Programs 
The collected works on nuclear proliferation explains why states are attracted to 
nuclear programs. One important aspect of these works is the aspect which explains 
the demand-side of nuclear proliferation. Diverse state actors are investigated in their 
role as having contributions in the demanding of a nuclear weapons case. These 
policy makers determine the national defence policy such as the nuclear policy the 
state will have in the region and globally. 
 
Solingen‟s 1994 work “The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint” argued that 
governments pursing economic development are more likely to accept regional 
nuclear governments seeking peaceful nuclear energy as opposed to the inward-
orientated, radicalized and nationalistic regimes that are more likely to perceive 
nuclear development as a threat to their security.
108
 Sagan‟s work titled “Three 
Models in Search of a Bomb” outlined security pressure, domestic political will and 
international laws on the spread of nuclear weapons as having a determinative effect 
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on nuclear proliferation.
109
 Security pressure usually emanates from the military 
inspirations of the top generals and political elites. Secondly domestic political will 
includes political class both the elected and administrative class who act to back or 
disrupt calls for nuclear weapons using legislation. Lastly international law focuses 
on customs and statutes that can promote or discourage the attainment of nuclear 
weapons. Sagan developed a strong support on the security model that a military 
sector promoting or pushing for nuclear weapons would result in a state initiating a 
nuclear weapons program.
110
 On the other hand, domestic administrative support and 
moral society backing were sufficient though not mandatory conditions for 
establishing nuclear weapons. 
 
Three case-study situations in North Korea, Iran and India concentrate on the 
intentions and tactical inclinations of both the administrative and political leaders.
111
 
It will be particularly respected, consequently, for forthcoming investigators to 
examine these models more extensively. The secrecy of nuclear weapons programs 
has led researchers (such U.S. intelligence experts) to investigate whether nuclear 
installations and equipment are for peaceful use or military basis. This problem 
called nuclear ambiguity questions whether the administration is seeking nuclear 
weapons or it is not.
112
 On the other hand, nuclear opacity is the regime using civilian 
nuclear programs to hide its real purpose? Political leaders may not have an intention 
or well-planned nuclear policy. The political leadership may act under calls from 
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other groups driving for either nuclear arms or for nonviolent civilian energy. This is 
determined by a wide variety of political and community conditions that appear 
usually after the leadership has opened up dialogue on nuclear programs. 
 
An example is the case of India after the state pursed a nuclear bomb from 1945 to 
1998.
113
 The need for political independence was seen as a “strategic enclave” by the 
pro-bomb administration officials under the India nuclear institution Nuclear 
reduction regulations trying to stop hesitant actors avoid doing what they have no 
intention to actually do might end up as counterproductive resulting in a state or 
administrative resistance to external controls.
114
 Realism claims that most political 
leader require a bomb mostly for security reasons but in actual fact few leader 
actually desire to have one since this is revolutionary decision and leap into the 
unknown.
115
 The leaders usually do not know if this decision will be well executed 
by the construction sector or worse what the potential out of the move might be to 
home land security.  
 
Lastly, Solingen‟s Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle 
East deliberates the nuclear behaviour of countries in those two regions, which had 
like potentials in the initial 1970s but have then experienced dissimilar nuclear 
tracks. Solingen‟s concentrated regional contrast approach uses thorough case 
revisions in order to exam her chosen model-a “global integration” prototype that 
emphases on the grade to which the regime centres its internal political endurance on 
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commercial assimilation into the international economy-against other theories.
116
 The 
strong point in Singh & Way‟s (2004) work is the study on the relationship between 
economic status of a state and nuclear propagation. A state with stronger GDP and 
sound trade percentages is more capable of exploring, initiating and developing 
nuclear weapons. This is important because of the cost involved in nuclear 
development. Such an economic incentive might act as an enabling factor.  
Commercial development is of paramount importance however this statement was 
still unclear since there are countries with strong GDP and trade balances like 
Australia and Canada but have no nuclear weapons. Thus, economic development is 
not completely a cause factor in nuclear propagation. 
 
2.5 The NPT, Regime Type, and Nuclear Proliferation 
Since the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty lacks sound controls to halt the spread of 
nuclear weapons there is need to understand state intentions in having nuclear 
weapons. Regime type has more to do in nuclear proliferation as it is the one on both 
the supply and demand side. Thus, if the NPT is to be effective regulation policy 
should be at both the demand and supply side. Any regulator tool that seek to reduce 
or prevent the spread of  nuclear weapons has to be focused on the regimes in 
practise to question if more states would have gone for nuclear weapons if the treaty 
was implemented.
117
 Some scholars such as Betts disagrees with the legalist outlook 
of the NPT stating that even if contracts are valuable it remains a delusion to regard 
them as complete solutions.
118
 The NPT and CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban 
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Treaty) reveal the intention of their supporters to shun nuclear-powered weapons.
119
 
Others states where signatories of the NPT only to cheat on their obligations such as 
North Korea and Iraq. In the event that the NPT or the CTBT could avert nuclear 
proliferation, there would have been evidence of this of at least one state that tried to 
acquire weapons but failed due to the effect of the treaties.  
 
Betts‟s account is outdated. He overlooks how many countries not regarded as 
“problematic” now were once dreaded probable nuclear proliferators before. A 1963 
Robert McNamara Defence Department statement projected that eight states might 
purse nuclear-powered weapons by year 1973: These are Sweden, West Germany, 
Japan, Israel, Australia, South Africa, India and China.
120
 Egypt was regarded to hold 
a modest incentive and a capacity to develop nuclear weapons. This brings up the 
question of regime type. Democratic nations and undemocratic states are regarded as 
similar in their nuclear policies. Majority of the cases have democratic states been 
nuclear powers such as the USA, Germany and France than non-democratic states. 
Regime type has no much impact on whether a state becomes nuclear or not. 
Democratic states were more likely to have pursue nuclear programs than autocratic 
states.
121
 However this is not accurate since nuclear policies are made by states 
therefore regimes are important units of study in the nuclear debate. He argues that 
this is a result of two reasons; democratic states are more loyal to nationalist 
pressures and secondly democratic states use nuclear programs as a diversion of 
national domestic reasons. 
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Democratic acceptance of nationalist pressures may be an attempt to seek acceptance 
from the citizens and preserve power.
122
 In the same light argues that advanced 
democracies are associated with nuclear weapons attainment as they have high 
probability that they fall under demands of nationalist forces. There is also a cause 
effect relation on the NPT and Nuclear Weapons States (NWSs) since the latter 
usually find it better not to give nuclear support to their allies considering other 
NWSs do not also provide support to their allies. Article I of the NPT seeks to 
maintain this shared nuclear control obligation.
123
 On the extreme end the Non-
Nuclear Weapons States (NNWSs) regard themselves safe if or unnecessary to 
pursue nuclear weapons provided other (NNWSs) are restraining or showing no 
interest in nuclear weapons. This guarantee is offered by the IAEA and Article II 
regulations. Thus in this respect the NPT encourage accountability in the use of 
civilian nuclear programs and facilities. The IAEA has a regulatory regime in place 
that seeks to discourage actors from follow a bomb path. The possible measures 
against offenders could be substantial financial cost if a regime was suspected of 
having a clandestine nuclear weapons program.  
 
More research is needed to assess the aspect of regime type in nuclear development. 
Democratic nations usually have no double standards in their nuclear programs as 
they have more transparency and accountability allowing for even international 
inspections. Questions have been raised concerning conduct of democratic nations 
and their defence policy. In general, are democratic states more disciplined in their 
treaty obligations or they simply chose to be loyalists of international nuclear law? 
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To answer this question one has to understand the formation of democratic states. 
The leaders seem to be more sensitive the democratic audience who have a power to 
chastise them in elections by voting them out if they are seen to be deviating from 
their nuclear obligations.  The way democratic states are governed gives one a clue 
as to why. This might not be the case with undemocratic states as they are not usually 
answerable to the citizens such as North Korea and the way the regime is formed is 
not a direct result of free choice but manipulation and government control. Citizen 
has very little power to none in shaping the behaviour of the leadership.
124
 
 
Patrimonial and religious regimes as well as empire like regimes characterized by 
high regulation and censorship, lack of accountability in the form of checks and 
balances will likely be more prone to nuclear proliferation.
125
 There is need to have 
more study in the field of nuclear proliferation. This investigation should take into 
account regime type, regional location, domestic administrations and their foreign 
policies. By combining the demand and supply side more answers can be obtained as 
to why states pursue nuclear weapons.
126
 The two side of nuclear proliferation should 
not be investigated separately but should be linked in case studies. Both these side 
will reflect how determined a regime will work towards a nuclear program.  
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CHAPTER III: 
THE CASE OF IRAN 
3.1 Iran Nuclear Development 1950s and 60s 
The Iranian nuclear program was initiated by the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza 
Pahlavi who was the former supreme leader around late 1950s.
127
 In 1957 a nuclear 
cooperation agreement was finalised as an accord under the Atoms for Peace 
Arrangement. In 1960 and agreement was concluded to acquire small 5MW reactor 
for nuclear research at the Tehran University. The former USA President Eisenhower 
initiated the Atoms for Peace program at UN in 1953.
128
 The purpose of the 
agreement was to formalise the international atomic energy agency allowing the 
utilisation of nuclear materials for civilian purposes. A special function of nuclear 
program was to introduce nuclear energy to parts of the world that was in need of 
such a resource. Iran therefore developed cooperation ties with other developing 
countries on nuclear development. In 1967 the USA provided Tehran's research 
reactor with highly enriched uranium. The following year Iran signed the Non-
Proliferation Treaty on the day of the signature call. 
 
3.2 Iran pursues nuclear power 1970s 
In 1974 the Shah of Iran setup the Iran Atomic Energy Organization which set the 
official announcement of a comprehensive ruthless nuclear development program 
that saw the development of over 20 nuclear powered reactors. That would 
eventually include over 20 nuclear power reactors.
129
 Major western powers such as 
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Germany, France and the USA actively supported the Iranian nuclear program as 
they sought purchase deals with Iran. There were claims by Geoffrey that Iran‟s 
nuclear program has military motives and this was because of potential threats from 
the Soviet Union, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and India.  
 
3.3 The Shah's nuclear ambitions 
In the year 1974, The Shah stated that Iran would obtain nuclear weapons sooner and 
definitely without fail according to the Nuclear Threat Initiative 2004.
130
 Iran leaders 
later withdrew those remarks and the Shah stated that Iran will not seek a nuclear 
weapon. This was backed by a policy statement in 1975 that Iran would only 
consider its nuclear policy if smaller states began developing nuclear weapons. 
Akbar the founder of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) stated in an 
interview that he had spoken to the Shah in the mid-1970s where he was told that the 
Shah would not build a nuclear weapon because this would isolate Iran and prevent 
the state from obtaining nuclear technology.
131
 However the Shah went on to state 
that Iran‟s nuclear policy will shift from civilian to military if other countries begin 
the process of acquiring nuclear bombs. Akbar therefore created a special research 
team to allow Iran to access all nuclear equipment and technologies thus allowing the 
policy makers the ability to make necessary decision be it for a bomb of not without 
being detected. 
 
Prior to the revolution in Iran the state was governed by Shah Pahlavi. He had warm 
relations with the west and he obtained military and financial support. Before 1979 
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France and Germany greatly supported all sectors of the nuclear program in Iran. The 
USA invested quite a large amount of money into the nuclear program also however 
they had restrains concerning the policy of non-proliferation after World War II and 
the disaster in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
132
 The US was not sure about the real 
intentions of the Shah concerning the nuclear program. The former USA President 
Eisenhower signed a nuclear cooperation deal with Iran for civilian purposes as a 
section of the „Atoms for Peace‟ plan crafted by the USA to utilise nuclear materials 
for peaceful and not military purposes.  
 
Thus, states would obtain access and support to nuclear research and energy in the 
event that they let go any ambitions to acquire nuclear bombs.
133
 This agreement 
later became known as the Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of Atoms. Iran 
became a signatory of the NPT on the 1
st
 of July 1968. As obtained by the Brookings 
Institute, the AP program was the bedrock foundation upon which Iran received 
important nuclear expertise and technological support.
134
 The program was 
commenced with the launch of a nuclear reactor meant for research under the Tehran 
Nuclear Research Centre.
135
 The program was executed for more than a decade from 
the early 1970s which led to The Shah of Iran setting up the Atomic Energy 
Organization of Iran (AEOI) increasing the nuclear budget from $30 million to over 
$1 billion. The AEOI had several training protocols signed including with 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) which trained several nuclear scientists 
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at Masters Level. Kraftwerk Union a Germany based company signed a cooperation 
deal to establish Bushehr‟s two nuclear reactors. 
 
Internationally the Shah had initiated a deal which would see Iran possessing 11% 
stake at an enrichment facility comprising several other states. At that time, Iran 
made a $1 billion exchange deal in return Iran would obtain highly enriched uranium 
from the Eurodif centre. Thus, the centre somehow acted as a provider of nuclear 
materials at the same time preventing the proliferation and exchange of nuclear 
machinery. Up to date Iran possesses 11% stake however France had rejected Iran 
from obtaining it since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
136
 
 
3.4 1979-1988 the Iranian Revolution  
In 1979 the Shah‟s unpopular regime was removed which saw Ayatollah Khomeini 
return from exile and he established an Islamic Republic. The regime went on to 
cancel the Shah‟s nuclear program and declared it „un-Islamic‟.137 The reaction of the 
Western states was one of suspicion as to what the real ambitions of Khomeini were. 
Hence the west imposed sanctions restricting Iran from accessing nuclear technical 
support and nuclear materials. The coming into power of the revolutionary Islamic 
regime led to the end of the USA nuclear participation in the Iran nuclear program in 
1979. The human cost of the Iran-Iraq war motivated the regime leaders to seek a 
stronger nuclear deterrent. Iraq attacked Iran using chemical weapons and Iran was 
under a US arms embargo. The Iran-Iraq war led Iran to have a stronger defence 
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policy and this led the state to realise how vulnerable they were.
138
 In 1988 Hashemi 
Rafsanjani, former speaker parliament, suggested that Iran should develop nuclear 
and modern weapons as a result of the war time experiences with Iraq which led to 
chemical attacks on the Iranian army. Rafsanjani stated that they should fully equip 
ourselves both in the offensive and defence use of chemical, bacteriological, and 
radiological weapons according to Middle East Defence News article 1991. 
 
3.5 The Factors behind Iran’s Nuclear Program 
The west might have their reasons to be concerned about Iran‟s nuclear program. The 
question to ask now is what Iran‟s nuclear motivations and what are the forces 
behind these ambitions. Iran‟s number one foe the USA practised a containment 
policy against Iran so as to limit the nuclear development in Iran by putting 
economic and political sanctions and also backed regime change groups aimed at 
overthrowing the Iranian regime even through forceful means. Iran has therefore 
security concerns as a counter containment method by developing nuclear weapons. 
After being accorded a position in the USA “axis of evil” Iran is a vulnerable target 
in the region especially from nearby the USA military installations.
139
 
 
The late 1970s saw the change in Iranian politics and its status in the region. The 
proceeding folly by the USA of backing Saddam Hussein against Iran was one event 
that set Iran defence and foreign policy for years to come.
140
 Saddam ended up using 
chemical weapons against Iran and also invading Kuwait because of the USA 
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backing. On the other hand, if Iran had nuclear weapons it would remove nearby the 
USA threats to Iran. This definitely changed Iran‟s thinking about possessing nuclear 
weapons due to sense of insecurity in the region and global political system. The 
perception of having a nuclear bomb was regarded as useful in maintains the 
sovereignty of the country. Iranian leadership perhaps thought that a nuclear 
weapons program would be a source of strategic deterrence in the event of the USA 
attack on Iran. 
 
Another significant reason why Iran seeks nuclear weapons is the issue power and 
influence in the Persian Gulf. The weakening of Iraq and the possibility of instability 
in Saudi Arabia, Iran becomes a more favourable candidate to occupy a prestigious 
place in the region.
141
 Thus Iran with nuclear weapons can have more leverage in a 
contest of power and influence. Sagan‟s 1996 work titled “Three Models in Search of 
a Bomb” outlined security pressure, domestic political will and international laws on 
the spread of nuclear weapons as having a determinative effect on nuclear 
proliferation. Security pressure emanated from the military inspirations. Iran‟s 
military administration is regarded to be a patriotic wing of the state that played 
serious role in the war against Iraq. The demand by this wing to have a more capable 
defense mechanism might explain why Iran purses nuclear weapons. A military 
sector promoting or pushing for nuclear weapons would result in a state initiating a 
nuclear weapons program Secondly domestic political will include political class 
both the elected and administrative class who act to back or disregard calls for 
nuclear weapons using legislation. The Iranian presidency as well as legislature has 
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over the years passed various pieces of laws legalizing nuclear research and 
development since 1970s.
142
  
 
The 1979 revolution which overthrew the Iranian monarchy saw the country been 
run by a Shia Islamic government. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is the state‟s Supreme 
Leader and the uppermost authority in the Republic of Iran. He makes major policy 
decisions including foreign and defense policy covering nuclear development. Such a 
backing by such a profound figure explains why Iran is also pursuing nuclear 
weapons.
143
 Thus domestic administrative support and moral society backing are 
sufficient though not mandatory conditions for establishing nuclear weapons. Lastly 
international law focused on customs and statutes that can promote or discourage the 
attainment of nuclear weapons such as the NPT protocol allows states to have 
peaceful nuclear capabilities according. Hence Iran might be leveraging the statures 
of the NPT as a signatory or in the worse-case scenario; Iran might be using the NPT 
to hide its weapons program.  
 
Researchers can use guidelines to determine Iran‟s nuclear ambitions according to 
nuclear proliferation experts utilise Meyer‟s ground-breaking work The Dynamics of 
Nuclear Proliferation.
144
 Meyer came up with a set of ten mechanical based and 
financial orientated indicators. These can be summarised as the domestic mining 
conditions, presence of locally sourced uranium deposits, and availability of 
metallurgy experts, steel manufacturing industry, construction teams, biochemical 
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experts and skilled physicists to determine whether a nation had latent capacity to 
produce nuclear weapons.  This work might explain why states such as Iran pursue 
nuclear weapons. Iran is believed to have highly sophisticated metallurgy experts and 
large reserves of uranium deposits locally available. Its highly-developed 
manufacturing industry also works as a starting point in the development process of 
nuclear materials. Due to these supply-side resources Iran, can easily be enticed into 
pursing nuclear weapons because the state possesses all the much-needed materials 
and knowhow to start such a sensitive process. The global supply of nuclear related 
support aids in fast-tracking the spread of nuclear weapons.
145
  
 
Such kind of nuclear support can be viewed as structural and sensitive by allies 
providing a potential nuclear state with nuclear ingredients that will be used to 
manufacture the weapons. This applies to three states that produced nuclear weapons 
after being offered nuclear support and resources from allies: These were Pakistan, 
China and Israel. Kroenig discovers that international backing from Russia, North 
Korea, Brazil and China of the Iran nuclear industry is therefore associated with the 
state‟s nuclear ambition. This is further supported by the Iran‟s gross national 
product, industrial base and the Iranian regime undertaking the nuclear program. This 
makes an interesting assumption that states such as Iran with international nuclear 
assistance or local capacity are more likely to develop a nuclear weapons program. In 
the end, it can be noted that there are various driving forces behind Iran‟s nuclear 
development.
146
 However they all fall under demand and supply side. 
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3.6 Iran Nuclear Enrichment Programs 1980-2015 
The Iranian nuclear program has been hit by various cyber-attacks including the 
2009 Stuxnet virus that hit computer programs associated with the nuclear program. 
This led to the decommissioning of over 800 centrifuges.
147
 However the Fordow 
Enrichment Center had an over 20% enriched uranium output. How did Iran get to 
this level and capacity? To answer this question one has to investigate the historical 
background of the Iranian program. 
 
South Africa sold over 500 tons of uranium to Iran in the late 1970s. This is believed 
to be the major source of materials being used in the enrichments programs in Iran. 
The sources of uranium in Iran are limited and expensive to extract from start. In the 
early 1980s Iran purchased 450 tons of uranium from South Africa. Some 366 tons of 
this was subsequently converted to enriched uranium at Esfahan. This is the main, 
and practically the only, material being used in Iran's enrichment plants.
148
 This is 
due to the impurities in the resources which makes extraction and enrichment costly. 
The Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center is one of the main uranium conversion 
centers in Iran. However, the plant is under strict control of the IAEA. As of 2005 the 
IAEA made it public that over 600 tons of uranium had been produced indicating 
that Iran has the capacity and technical knowhow to convert resources into processed 
nuclear materials.  
 
This development can be traced to high research efforts placed in the Iranian nuclear 
program. In 1967 a nuclear research center was setup called the Tehran Nuclear 
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Research Center.
149
 The center was established with technical support of the USA 
providing Iran with 5MW reactor and has since been operational. It is important to 
note that the IAEA has several monitoring agencies on the plant. In 1988 Argentina, 
nuclear specialists converted 90% of the raw materials at the plant into highly 
enriched uranium. In Argentina provided Iran with 120 kg of enriched uranium 
which is reasonably sufficient to last over 2 decades. By 2010 the 120 kg has been 
depleted reflecting a high enrichment level. Thus, evidence of international backing 
can be seen in the Iranian nuclear program. In late 2010 Russia aided Iran with more 
uranium for their reactor in exchange of 5% highly enriched uranium from the plant 
at Natanz. Iran refused this deal but revised the contract offering to supply Russia in 
small amounts over time and not in one shipment implying that Iran was now able to 
control the enriched materials for more time and do more with it. 
 
Efforts to have a nuclear material deal with turkey and brazil failed in 2010 after Iran 
offered to ship 1500kg of enriched uranium to Brazil and Turkey in exchange of fuel 
technology and elements from the Russia, France, the USA and the IAEA making up 
the Vienna group. The Isfahan Nuclear Center has over 3 nuclear reactors used for 
research purposes supplied by China.
150
 The announcement in 2010 by Iran to have a 
new nuclear center at Shiraz capable of producing 20% enriched uranium led to 
international attention to be focused on the Iranian nuclear program. Iran went on to 
build a water reactor called the IR-40 at Arak and this reactor is identical to the ones 
used in Israel and Pakistan to produce plutonium needed in the manufacturing of 
nuclear weapons. The refusal by Iran to provide the IAEA with details of the IR-40 
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design plans in 2006 led to speculation that the project was meant to be for nuclear 
weapons development.
151
 The UNSC made calls that Iran without delay should halt 
the construction of the plant. Iran declined the allegations noting that the plant was 
not meant for the production of plutonium and that its materials were not at weapons 
grade. In 2015 the UNSC went on to setup the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
and China as a member has agreed to downgrade the Arak reactor. The JCPA 
consisted of China, France, Germany, the USA, Iran, Russia, the United Kingdom 
and the European Union (EU). Popularly known as the Iran deal, the framework was 
a tool that was meant to eliminate the potential militarization of the Iranian nuclear 
program and ensure that any development is solely for peaceful purposes. 
 
3.7 Iran’s Nuclear Program and Threats to Security 
An important question that has been a critical security issue is whether the Iranian 
nuclear program poses a threat to regional and international security. The Western 
countries assumes a nuclear armed Iran will have serious repercussions for regional 
and international security especially for their allies. Iran signed the NPT in 1970 and 
singed several safeguard mechanisms that entitled the IAEA to inspect the nuclear 
programs in Iran. In 2002 several undeclared nuclear centers drew international 
attention and the IAEA made inspections revealing several inconsistencies to the 
protocols signed which led to the alarm that Iran had violated IAEA nuclear 
standards and its treaty obligations under the NPT. For over 2 decades Iran 
structurally hid some of its nuclear development programs regarded to have the 
capacity of developing nuclear weapons. Iran acknowledged to having undeclared 
nuclear sites but simply labeled the activities there as ordinary. In 2005 the IAEA 
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asked Iran to suspend operations at these sites and to list them. The UNSC was called 
upon by the IAEA to put measures for compliance which resulted in the council 
calling Iran to suspend all activities without delaying including enrichment and 
processing plans. Iran refused to withdraw and continued with its operations. By 
2007 the UNSC passes a unanimous decision adopting measures to impose sanctions 
on the Iran nuclear program. Iran continued to refuse the IAEA access to the 
experimental and research sites such as at Parchin.
152
 
 
Iran possessing nuclear weapons will appear as an aggressive foreign policy and will 
make regional and international foes uncomfortable resulting in more chances of 
confrontations.
153
 Iran is currently capable of hitting targets within the region, 
Europe and the USA troops stationed around the Middle East. In the event that the 
Iranian regime develops nuclear powered weapons the existing threat will rise 
significantly. Iran is regarded as of the major state sponsors of international terrorism 
through its economic system and also by offering technical support to militant 
movements like Hamas and Hezbollah based in Lebanon and Palestine. These groups 
have destroyed property worth millions in the region and killed many civilians. A 
nuclear armed Iran might distribute its nuclear weapons, nuclear know-how and 
technology to such extremist groups that are antagonistic to the west as well as 
regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and Israel.
154
 Thus Iran nuclear program might 
pose a perceived threat to regional and international security especially in the event 
that the other powers retaliate by acquiring a nuclear bomb in what can be seen as an 
effort to correct the balance of power. Iran could potentially share its nuclear 
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technology and know-how with extremist groups hostile to the USA and the Western 
states such as Germany and France. Iran armed with nuclear weapons also poses a 
threat to USA and western allies in the region. The particular example is Israel since 
Iran‟s leadership has over the years threatened to wipe out Israel of the world map 
according to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Moderate western and the USA allies 
such as UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain are constantly watching what they perceive 
to be Iran‟s offensive regional policy and might feel threatened by a potentially 
nuclear-armed Iranian regime.
155
 
 
The Middle East is an important source of energy for the world as major source of 
oil. The Iran‟s perceived and offensive regional policy had driven its neighbors to 
acquire and purchase arms in an attempt to balance power as they feel more insecure. 
A possible conflict between regional powers will likely affect the production and 
distribution of oil. This is greatly affects the region and the world‟s energy security. 
Some experts like Sagan also fear that this might go on to spark a nuclear arms race 
in the region that will only destabilize and already vital and volatile region as 
claimed by the realist school of thought as there is no central power to safeguard the 
security of other states.
156
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3.8 Adequacy of Security Theories under the Iran Nuclear Program 
An investigation of the theories outlined above in relation to the forces behind Iran‟s 
nuclear program shows that there is no one answer to this question. To start with 
realism one can conclude that Iran‟s motivation is driven by human nature to defend 
her against perceived and potential threats. The international system has no 
overreaching authority to regulate the behavior of actors, therefore there should be a 
balance of power in the Middle East which can only be achieved by a strong Iran 
exercising her power over weaker regional powers by obtaining nuclear weapons. 
This might explain why Iran is pursuing nuclear program for military or civilian use 
because a nuclear capable state has leverage over regional and international politics. 
Hobbes disagrees sharply with the view that under such scenarios it is the strong that 
regulate the order of the international sphere.  
 
Hobbes assumptions of the State of Nature, all men (states) are equal and thus 
relatively weaker states such as Iran, has also strength and capacity to kill the 
strongest such the USA and other Western countries, by secret machination as well 
as by confederacy with others like China and Russia that are facing the same threat 
zone.
157
 Iran being initially a relatively weak state compared to the USA would want 
to achieve parity through technical advancement especially in the field of nuclear 
development. This might explain why Iran might be interested in a nuclear weapons 
program for peaceful uses or otherwise. Iran might feel threatened by the hegemonic 
dominance of the USA in the region as well as the world. However, realism fails to 
explain the domestic aspect of Iran nuclear program and only focuses on the state as 
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the main actor in international relations. This brings one to the constructivism theory. 
Iran‟s military capacity of can be perceived as a menacing power or protecting 
capability by other states such as Israel. Does this then mean the Iran military 
structure is seeking a menacing status by pursing nuclear weapons? If the acquisition 
of nuclear weapons is solely for military prestige why is it then Iran‟s regime calls 
for civilian nuclear energy? This view seems to be half true while it can be argued 
that the military has an important need to be menacing, it is also untrue that one 
sector of the government determines the defense policy of a nation. This is because 
in modern Iran the parliament as well as the presidential office plays important roles 
in defense policy.
158
 
 
As opposed to neorealism that only basis its claims in the dominance of Iran‟s 
material power both economic and military, and neoliberal institutionalism that 
accepts a relatively narrow influence and role of non-material powers in international 
relations, constructivism gives top priority to the significance of a Iran`s discursive 
power.
159
 Discursive power has been defined as the political perceptions or 
interpretations of Iran in international relations based on historical ideas, culture, 
ideologies and material power. Iran`s discursive power is determined by ideas, 
culture, knowledge, ideology but also material power, both economic and political.
 
160 
In the same manner, the discursive power of Iran should be determined by ideas, 
culture as well as material power. What determines the nuclear policy of Iran is very 
much influenced by these notions. Iran‟s economic status backed by a sound oil 
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industry is very much capable of favoring nuclear programs. However how does 
culture contribute towards Iran‟s defense policy? This is a normative question that 
requires a new research on the role of culture in defense policy. A closer clue might 
be a culture of high national esteem and values is more defensive and protective than 
a culture with less regard to its values. Thus, this theory helps also to understand 
forces behind the Iran nuclear program. 
 
Last but not least is the Copenhagen approach to understanding the forcing behind 
Iran nuclear program. As an alternative approach, Buzan discusses security offering 
three levels of analysis and five sections of security. He argued that security can be 
viewed on individual, state and international system level. Thus, to understand the 
driving forces behind the Iranian nuclear program one has to understand the threats at 
individual level which include human security the need to create employment 
through nuclear development and as well as providing prestige and glory to 
individuals as citizens of a nuclear armed state in Iran. State security is much liked to 
Iran‟s protection against invasion, internal and external attacks in the region. At the 
international level, Iran seeks to counter perceived hostile powers such as the USA 
and other western states like France and Germany. This is then balanced by offering 
five sections of security which are environment based, economic issues, and politics 
based issues, societal and lastly military issues. An investigation of all the sections 
shows that forces behind Iran nuclear program are of a combined economic, political, 
societal, environmental and military nature as they all influence on another. This 
theory offers one a detailed framework to discuss the major components behind 
Iran‟s nuclear program. 
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CHAPTER IV: 
MAJOR FINDINGS: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES OF THE IRANIAN 
NUCLEAR PROGRAM 
4.1 The Realism Perspective 
Iran has caused serious debates among the UN as well as the UN Security Council 
(UNSC) as the state was suspected of developing nuclear capability from 2003. Iran 
also started developing ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads.
161
 It 
is clear the issue of nuclear proliferation is a major international security matter. This 
is despite any reason whatsoever justifying the research and development of such 
weapons. The process of nuclear weapons development for civilian or military 
purposes leads to many security concerns under the NPT as the major regulatory law 
of nuclear development and possession. 
 
Iran`s insecurity and fears cannot be accurately predicted but considering there is a 
threat from regional opponents such as Saudi Arabia and Israel chances are that their 
nuclear program is meant to increase the state‟s prestige and cover up insecurities 
regionally and international. It is also important to balance between need for nuclear 
development and insecurity. On this note it cannot be argued that the program is as a 
result of fear and insecurity as claimed by scholars associated with realism. The basic 
assumptions of Thucydides are similar to that of Hobbes however what is important 
is his argument that the strong must govern the weak to maintain order in the 
international system. This statement raises a question that: Is Iran trying to gain a 
nuclear advantage over its rivals so as to govern them or at least have a stronger 
voice in international decision making? To answer this question accurately it is 
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important to understand Iran‟s foreign policy as well as regional balance of power. 
When this argument is applied to states it can be seen that there is a desire to acquire 
a defensive and hegemonic position by states in an attempt to seek a redress caused 
by the disparities in the international system. 
 
The tenants posed in this works of Hobbes might explain why Iran is researching and 
developing a nuclear program and also recognise the differences in power 
capabilities of states in the region such a Saudi Arabia and Israel as well as the 
impact on foreign policy which can be both positive and negative. Therefore, Iran 
might be trying to secure power in the region and influence through various means 
including nuclear capabilities and development. Iran is therefore trying to obtain 
power through its nuclear program. The most outstanding weakness of these 
assumptions is that they are power oriented basing only on Iran‟s nuclear program as 
power based thus fail to identify other factors such as the power of democratic 
citizens in Iran to influence foreign policies, idealism and the rule of law instead of 
power. In this instance is the Iran nuclear program backed by citizen support? To 
answer this question, it is important to understand that Iran holds parliamentary as 
well as presidential elections to decide the nation‟s policy makers including nuclear 
program. Definitely the decision to pursue nuclear weapons might not be directly a 
citizen demand but the backing of the Iranian citizens might propel the regime in Iran 
to pursue nuclear capabilities. Thus, the elections held in Iran are a source of citizen 
support to the administration that whatever defence policy the government is 
working on, it has a mandate from the people to execute freely. 
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Theorists associated with realist assumption such Hobbes and Thucydides argued 
that human beings are by nature individualist and seek to maximize power at the 
expense of others.
162
 Therefore social structures in Iran are usually ineffective in 
taking out the human nature which according to Snyder represents a perpetual 
restless desire for power that could only end in death. In Iran, social or political 
setups by nature are always struggling for power this can be seen through various 
groups competing for control of parliamentary positions and even the presidential 
post in a bid to determine policy action. Ultimately this competition is even 
expressed more in the winning party‟s defence and foreign policy such as nuclear 
development. Iran‟s nuclear program might be explained as a struggle for power and 
dominance inherent in human nature. However, power can still be obtained without 
the need to possess it at the expense of other states.  
 
Iran is also entitled under international law to defend itself against perceived 
enemies.
163
  Due to the lack of a central authority in the Middle East, officials and 
states in the region are in a state of nature, one which Hobbes describes as anarchical 
and lacking any central authority to regulate and govern individual actors. As a 
result, governments and states such as Iran and Israel tend to seek power and 
protection from such a lawless state of nature as the struggle for scarce resources 
becomes fierce by way of developing a nuclear program. However, argument seems 
to be less applicable in the Middle East as states are signatories of international law 
and members of organisations such as the Arab League that make binding rules on 
all members thereby removing lawlessness and anarchy. Thus, to state that Iran is 
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pursuing a nuclear program because of a lack of central authority might not be 
accurate enough. 
 
Politics is the utility of power in international relations. He argues that power is the 
control of man over man.
164
 As Iran possess territories, resources and influence in the 
end the more power and capability the more they can ultimately control the way of 
life and politics in the Middle East. Power in this regard is defined in terms of Iran‟s 
political and military strength. Therefore, in discussing this idea it can be argued that 
Iran‟s political leaders think and act in terms of power defined as political and 
national interest. Universal moral principles or in modern terms; international laws 
cannot be fully applied to the actions of Iran as they view morality as a threat to their 
national interests.  
 
Countries in the global system are of similar fashion such as units of a state in a 
domestic structure and they have identical interests: Survival.
165
 In the Middle East, 
the setup of the global political system in particular the UN authority system that is 
controlled by five permanent members like the USA, Britain, Russia, China and 
France, is usually influenced by the notion that some countries such as Iran would 
rather survive and hence purse controversial political goals based on a long term 
view and they behave with the need to realize that goal by any means necessary 
including nuclear programs. The similarity in the behaviour of states such as Iran and 
North Korea that have nuclear program in contrast to international law over years can 
be argued to have been caused by the limitations on their behaviour imposed by the 
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structures of the global system most the UN which has a power and authority 
imbalance.
166
 The UN and the Arab League systems are defined by the principles 
(economic or political) on which they are built, followed by the layout of its units in 
the form of member states, and lastly by the layout and distribution of political, 
military and economic capabilities (power) across units. International anarchy which 
Waltz defines as the absence of central governing authority stands as the outstanding 
principle of the UN international system as all members are regarded as equal in 
principle.
167
 The units of the international structure are the states like Iran. These 
states might seek to redress the imbalance of power in the region and in the world 
caused by structural nature of the international organisations for instance the UN and 
Arab League. 
 
Since all Iran places survival on the core of its policies, it can be argued that anarchy 
is generated as the state regard the structure as a self-help system in which individual 
states have to take care of themselves. Ultimately the roles and influence of Iran are 
based on her capabilities as a unit or state. The strength of these assumptions is based 
on the utility of power, units and capabilities in relation to state behaviour. The role 
played by Iran is determined by the number of units or states influencing it both 
regionally and internationally. This influence might be regarded by Iran as threats 
from Israel and Saudi Arabia as opponents or opportunities from Syria and Lebanon 
as Iran‟s allies. It can also be argued that Iran possessing greater capabilities 
including nuclear programs tend to seek more power and the desire to influence more 
                                                          
166
 Hans Morgenthau, Scientific Man Versus Power Politics, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1946), p. 34. 
167
 Kenneth Waltz, „Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory‟, International Affairs School, (1990), 
pp.39-48. 
 
80 
 
 
  
units in the international system in an attempt to survive or dominate.
168
 Moral 
principles in international politics are not as important as survival as argued by Waltz 
which is a strong proposition. 
 
4.2 The Constructivism Perspective 
In constructivism anarchy and the unequal distribution of military capabilities do not 
determine Iran‟s identity and its relations with others.169 A strong military capacity of 
Iran can be perceived as a menacing power or protecting capability by other states in 
the region. Does this then mean the Iran military structure is seeking a menacing 
status by pursing nuclear weapons? If the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran is 
solely for military prestige why is it then Iran‟s regime calls for civilian nuclear 
energy? This view seems to be half true while it can be argued that the military has 
an important need to be menacing, it is also untrue that one sector of the Iranian 
government determines the defense policy of the nation.
170
 This is because in modern 
Iran the parliament as well as the presidential office plays an important role in 
defense policy of Iran. 
 
For instance, the Iranian nuclear weapons capability is perceived differently by Syria 
as compared to a nuclear weapons program in the hands of Israel as these states are 
both an ally and a foe of Iran. Although Iran‟s military power and its distribution 
always become influencing factors in international relations, the two cannot 
exhaustively interpret relations among states in the Middle East. The relationship 
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between Iran and Saudi Arabia as regional opponents in terms of the potential to be 
become allies for cooperation or enemies in conflict can be forecasted by only 
understanding the military structures of the concerned states. Thus, by investigating 
the military structures, goals and nuclear capabilities of Iran and Saudi Arabia one 
can conclude that, Iran seeks to maximize power in relation to the regional and 
international military status of her regional competitors. Iran`s political identities in 
terms of governance and its social structures are also important factors that determine 
the type and quality of relations with other states. Iran‟s social structure is one 
characterized by an overwhelming Islamic populace that is very supportive of the 
government‟s policies. This is even more when religion acts as social glue led by Ali 
Khamenei the Supreme Leader of Iran.
171
  
 
Similar political identities such as the governance structures and long-history of 
cooperation between Iran and Russia for instance, can be a basis upon which 
cooperative security system are established; but distinct political identities and long-
history of tension between Israel and Iran can result in the construction of a 
competitive regional security system leading to Iran pursuing a stronger military 
status. Countries cooperate in nuclear programs based on their governance structures, 
goals and history. It might be argued that Iran‟s nuclear cooperation with Russia and 
North Korea in terms of expertise, machinery and equipment is a direct result of 
similar constructive structures according to Aljazeera news source.
172
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In addition, as opposed to neorealism that only basis its claims in the dominance of 
Iran‟s material power both economic and military, and neoliberal institutionalism 
that accepts a relatively narrow influence and role of non-material powers in 
international relations, constructivism gives top priority to the significance of a Iran`s 
discursive power. Discursive power has been defined as in the case study the 
political perceptions or interpretations of Iran in international relations based on 
historical ideas, culture, ideologies and material power.
173
 Iran`s discursive power is 
determined by ideas, culture, knowledge, ideology but also material power, both 
economic and political. What determines the nuclear policy of Iran is very much 
influenced by these notions. Iran‟s economic status backed by a sound oil industry is 
very much capable of favoring nuclear programs. However how does Iran‟s culture 
contribute towards the defense policy? This is a normative question that requires a 
new research on the role of culture in defense policy. A closer clue might be a culture 
of high national esteem and values is more defensive and protective than a culture 
with less regard to its values. 
 
These factors and influences through state actors interact to construct the 
international system. Discursive power operates by creating and producing Iran‟s 
subjective perceptions. It aids in explaining how the material structure, international 
events, Iran‟s political identity, relations between or among the Middle East states, 
and any other social relations should be described and understood. With discursive 
power, the same material expression can be manipulated to produce certain 
interpretation and weaken alternative meanings. A typical example is that Iran due to 
its discursive power is able to present unique interpretations for North Korea or the 
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USA‟s security positions either as threats or opportunities for cooperation.174 The 
former seems not to be a real threat and the latter is an actual threat but both are 
nuclear weapons states; North Korea is not perceived as an enemy but the USA is an 
outright aggressor and enemy according to Iran. These political and security 
identifications are not induced as a result of material power alone or its distribution 
but they are a result of a construction through the Iran`s discursive power. Therefore, 
Iran through its discursive power might perceive the acquisition of nuclear weapons 
as beneficial, moral and necessary to its national survival. At the local level of 
constructivism and Iran‟s nuclear program has been, to a significant extent, 
influenced by forces of national pride and identity.
175
 However, the emphasis of 
domestic constructivist assumptions emphasizing nationalism finds its way up to the 
international level: Iran`s bitterness and victimization in foreign policy can be argued 
to be a result of long ill-treatment by other powers in the region such as Iraq which 
used chemical weapons against Iran in the early 1990s. There is a legitimate 
frustration with what Iran perceives as security double standards in the nuclear policy 
that would maintain their enemies‟ strategic dominance and supremacy but deny 
nuclear capability and facilities to other states in the Middle East.  
 
From this discussion, Iran‟s ideological reasons far outweigh strategic goals in 
motivating the state in pursuing a nuclear program, and propaganda policies.
176
 
Realist models that place a premium on external forces alone and strategic regional 
insecurity of Iran do not stand up to the ability to fully explain the state`s nuclear 
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ambitions. Fears of superpower biasness have been increased by the culture of weak 
state victimization, and the aggressive sense of superpower nuclear policies that has 
dominated the nuclear relations of states. This results in Iran seeking deterrence or 
defensive capabilities. Iran‟s military nuclear program usually perceived as a symbol 
of national pride, the nuclear program of the state draws popular support in 
constructivist theories, rather than regional strategic explanations.  
 
Iran‟s nuclear decision-making capacities might be concentrated in the hand of hard-
liners and clerical elites, thus the nuclear program enables the government to increase 
its self-identity as an anti-western and regional Islamic power.
177
 Though Iran‟s 
strategic interests may have initially propelled the nuclear programs as they offer 
foreign policy justifications vis-à-vis deterrence of the USA, powerful constructivist 
motivations, taken advantage of by Iran might be the central reasons behind the 
Iranian nuclear policy. The regime is perceived to be radical by Western states since 
many violations of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty by Iran has happened.
178
 
However it is still not enough to base assumptions on these factors in the domestic 
space of Iran. A more detailed debate will have to be executed in line with other 
relevant theories. 
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4.3 The Copenhagen Perspective 
Barry Buzan articulated the concept of security as a limited field and one that had to 
be broadening beyond the scope of just military centered.
179
 He therefore went 
further to elaborate the concept offering a more comprehensive view on Iran. This 
new approach incorporated perceptions that were not subsequently regarded to be 
part of the security nexus for instance notions of Iran‟s regional security, sociological 
and environmental subdivisions of security.  
 
The realist definition of Iran‟s security as being a wholesome contest for power is 
outmoded, resulting in a myopic world view, and this only hinders the strategy 
makers or international relations academics in coming to an inclusive understanding 
of the Iran nuclear program.
180
 As an alternative approach Iran‟s security can be 
viewed on individual, state and international system levels. This is then balanced by 
offering five sections of Iran‟s security which are environment based, economic 
issues, and politics based issues, societal and lastly military issues. The perceptions 
offered on Iran might not be exhaustive in isolation with regards to the question of 
securitization, they are related creating a network and sequence that political experts 
should untangle to comprehend all the concepts so as to grasp how the notions 
influence each other in total. In the first level of analysis focusing on the individual, 
in order to fulfill this intricate study of security in which Iran is assumed as the core 
referent, a question has to be asked with regards to this case what is the nature of Iran 
as a state actor? When explaining Iran‟s security in terms of individuals, it can be 
understanding that security can be measured as an aspect of life and its relative facets 
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of freedom, status, wealth and health.
181
  
 
Threats to Iran as a concept can be understood on an individual level. As stated, the 
concept of security is not a narrow model, because individual security and national 
security are two different but related notions. One can therefore reflect on the 
character of Iran in attempting to realize the security of larger and vaguer units which 
are nebulous in nature.
182
 A closer look at the nature of these elements in Iran one 
can tell that they can be turned into security related inquiries. By therefore studying 
them the broader picture of Iran‟s national security can be revealed in a more 
elaborative manner. The establishment of the interrelated network will help in 
coming up with answers to Iran‟s national defense policies. 
 
The military, political, economic, environmental and societal sectors of Iran affect 
the individual citizens due to the changes at the government level.
183
 What is of 
paramount importance is to realize that Iran‟s five security sections should not be 
investigated in a separated manner and they do not work in sole. Each sector 
describes a central point and helps to order security issues. A more interesting 
argument is the link between the sectors and the concept of threats. Threats to the 
environment and social aspects of Iran might be driving force in crafting Iran‟s 
defense policy. These threats might be in the form of global warming and clımate 
change or even the human security such as provision of jobs by creating new 
industries including nuclear related jobs. 
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The ecological, economic and societal sectors in Iran accompany the political and 
military securities and are more difficult to define. Threats of an economic nature are 
more challenging to study because of the complicated aspects of Iranian economics. 
As stated the normal conditions portrayed by Iran in a market based economy is one 
of danger, aggressive competition as well as vagueness, this apprehensive 
environment makes economic security tough to straighten out and how this 
ultimately affects the international relations of Iran.
184
 The economic sector is also a 
clear illustration of how the dissimilar sectors work together with one another. It is 
straightforward to see that Iran‟s military sector is reliant on the economic sector due 
do budget limitations. In addition, economic security can be deemed to be a key 
pointer as to the universal security of the state.  
 
Iran hence can be motivated to purse nuclear weapons due to its sound economy. 
However, this has limitations as some states like North Korea and Pakistan with 
relatively weaker economies still pursue nuclear programs. A comparison of the 
USA and Iran shows that where there is economic security in terms of a stronger 
GDP, other sectors of security are relatively easier to develop.
185
 Hence Iran`s 
economic security may determine its political and military policies in international 
relations such as nuclear research and development. Social securities in Iran are one 
of the most valued of all the other five segments of security. Disconnecting Iran‟s 
social security from political security is less academic since threats of a social nature 
are mostly linked to issues of national identity in any given nation. South Sudan is 
less prepared to deal with differences in national identities and customs as opposed to 
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Iran that has a strong identity and culture. Iran‟s societal perceptions including 
religious beliefs and nationalism therefore impact on type of government, policies 
and ultimately influencing the nation`s foreign policy. It is evident that social related 
security matters are highly related to the politics as well as the military segments of 
security in Iran. The majority of international conflicts including the controversial 
Iran nuclear program are mostly the ones with a societal category. Conflict between 
Iran and other regional or international actors were bound to happen due to 
differences in culture and civilizations which in turn determine threats, 
vulnerabilities and foes and allies.
186
 
 
It is consequently important to have more attention on this area and put them into the 
study of security especially on global level. Nevertheless, due to differences on 
civilizations between Iran and western states the concept of social security might not 
be simple to put into investigation without running the risk of being critically one-
sided and contextual creations. This can simply guide researchers and policy makers 
into political prejudgment and exclusion. Iran‟s environment based security aspects 
are complicated to define and might be regarded as very elusive when compared to 
the other five segments. The threats facing Iranians today as a result of changes in 
the environment pose a real danger to the lives of the society. These threats range 
from global warming to the ruin of the ozone layer have led to alternative solutions 
such as nuclear energy that might be perceived as threats by other actors in the 
international system. All sections must be taken into account when examining Iran‟s 
security, both in isolation and collectively. One can argue that there is friendship and 
hostility among states, thus relationships between states are determined by alliances 
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or simply by anxiety. The subjects that can disturb Iran`s regional position in terms 
of policy range from issues such as national ideology, territorial identity, ethnicity, 
and historical pattern.  
 
This is important to understand as it leads to the concept of hostility and determine 
the security situation or complex of Iran and its relative policies.
187
 Security 
complexes of Iran can be helpful in policy analysis and they also present an ideal 
framework to confer issues that are prevalent to a specific area. Possibly the most 
tremendous can be that of Israel and Iran. This security complex shows Israel‟s 
safety is connected to its regional position that is the Middle East and the opposite is 
also true of Iran, and in the end both sides take this complex into consideration when 
determining their national security policies. Threats and opportunities facing Iran in 
the regions can actor as positive and negative forces to develop nuclear weapons. 
These threats range from the USA military presence in the Gulf of Persia and Israel‟s 
hostility towards Iran. On the other side opportunities, can be in the form of regional 
power vacuums such as civil wars in Iraq, Syria and Yemen leading to Iran 
occupying an influential position in the region by developing a nuclear program. 
 
4.4 The Supply-Side Perspective 
To assess if a state is capable of developing a nuclear weapons program, researchers 
can use guidelines to determine a state‟s nuclear ambitions. Nuclear proliferation 
experts utilize Meyer‟s ground-breaking work The Dynamics of Nuclear 
Proliferation came up with a set of ten mechanical based and financial orientated 
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indicators.
188
 These can be summarized as in the case study Iran‟s domestic mining 
conditions, presence of locally sourced uranium deposits, and availability of 
metallurgy experts, steel manufacturing industry, construction teams, biochemical 
experts and skilled physicists-to determine whether Iran has latent capacity to 
produce nuclear weapons.  This work might explain why states such as Iran pursue 
nuclear weapons. 
 
It is challenging to assess the whether the availability of nuclear engineers in Iran as 
well as nuclear related materials could determine if the state was capable of forming 
a nuclear weapon. Meyer introduced two more standards to deal with this gap: First 
by checking if the Iranian government was working on a nuclear research program 
for periods up to three years and this would be a substitute for the atomic expert 
skills. Secondly if Iran had mass production of vehicles and factory manufactured 
radios or televisions; this substituted the skills needed for explosive making and 
electrical engineering as such a country had a capacity to deliver that already. Iran 
has thus provider is manufacturing ability so far in various industries including space 
exploration. Stoll introduced a new element in the standard of analysis while Meyer 
had focused on locally sourced uranium bases in Iran.
189
 Iran had access to nuclear 
resources stating that all states had access to nuclear materials in an international 
marketplace and those could be obtained fairly easily. Based on such notions Stoll 
noted that Iran has a dormant nuclear capacity. Iran might not produce a nuclear 
weapon unless is has highly enriched uranium obtained from its own local 
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reactors.
190
 Thus even if Iran might have obtained nuclear materials, very few states 
can actually enrich the uranium into weapons grade materials. Therefore, Stoll‟s 
conclusions are fundamentally inconsistent with this mechanical restriction. 
However, the inspections made by the International Atomic Energy Agency found 
Iran with highly enriched uranium. 
 
In short by focusing on Iran‟s supply side one can tell that the state‟s desire to have a 
nuclear bomb is related to the supply of nuclear materials and technical expertise 
needed to manufacture the bomb.
191
 This determines if Iran has a mechanical 
capacity to develop a bomb. The broader question is not about why so many nuclear 
capable states did not produce weapons but rather why Iran has developed or showed 
an interest in setting up nuclear facilities and machinery required to enrich uranium 
and the recycling of plutonium. It is worthwhile to note that the Iranian nuclear 
proliferation is associated with availability of capital and avenues of trade allowed 
under international commerce. The spread of nuclear facilities in Iran is strongly tied 
with the supply of technology and materials. Nuclear trade with Russia and North 
Korea offers material technology. The international nuclear backing of Iran by 
Russia is therefore associated with the produce of nuclear products.
192
 This is further 
supported by the Iran‟s GDP, industrial base and the type of regime in Iran which is 
rather independent in undertaking the nuclear program. This leads to an interesting 
assumption that Iran because of international nuclear assistance from Russia or local 
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capacity in terms of resources and skills was more likely to develop a nuclear 
weapons program. 
 
A new question emerges as to why would Iran and Russia trade or offer sensitive 
nuclear assistance to each other given the fact that this would without doubt allow for 
the spread of nuclear weapons in the region.
193
 Most experts tend to conclude that 
national interest fosters unity amongst allies and most regimes do this for the 
monetary benefits as a trading strategy. One may argue that Russia offering nuclear 
support to Iran might be interested in tilting the balance of power in an area of the 
interest. This is usually the case notwithstanding, the expected proliferation costs. 
Governments such as Russia and Iran which are allies are also more likely to offer 
complex nuclear technology or support to other regimes where the perceived 
opponents of the assisted regime are also regarded as foes of the supporting regime. 
The conclusion by Russia might be that Iran as the perceived foe of the USA and 
Israel might be a good customer. 
 
4.5 The Demand-Side Perspective 
Diverse political actors in Iran are investigated in their role as having contributions in 
the demanding of a nuclear program. These policy makers determine the national 
defense policy even so the nuclear policy in Iran. Sagan‟s work outlined Iran‟s 
security pressure, domestic political will and international laws on the spread of 
nuclear weapons as having a determinative effect on nuclear proliferation.
194
 Security 
pressure in Iran emanated from the military inspirations. Secondly domestic political 
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will include political class in Iran both the elected and administrative class who act to 
back or disregard calls for nuclear weapons using legislation. Lastly international law 
focused on customs and statutes that can promote or discourage the attainment of 
nuclear weapons by states. Sagan developed a strong support on the Iranian security 
model that the military sector promoting or pushing for nuclear weapons would 
result in Iran initiating a nuclear program. On the other hand, Iran‟s domestic 
administrative support and moral society backing were sufficient though not 
mandatory conditions for establishing nuclear weapons.
195
 
 
The case of Iran has a focus on the intentions and tactical inclinations of both the 
administrative and political leaders. It will be particularly respected, consequently, 
for forthcoming investigators to examine these models more extensively. The secrecy 
of the Iran nuclear programs has led researchers (such U.S. intelligence experts) to 
investigate whether nuclear installations and equipment are for peaceful use or 
military basis. Nuclear ambiguity of Iran questions whether the administration is 
seeking nuclear weapons or it is not.
196
 On the other hand, nuclear opacity is when 
Iran uses civilian nuclear programs to hide its real purpose? Abraham is of the notion 
that political leaders in Iran may not have an intention or well-planned nuclear 
policy. The political leadership may act under calls from other groups driving for 
either nuclear arms or for nonviolent civilian energy. This is determined by a wide 
variety of political and community conditions that appear usually after the leadership 
has opened up dialog on nuclear programs. 
 
                                                          
195
 Scott Sagan, Rethinking the causes of nuclear proliferation: three models in search of a bomb. In 
the South Asia,‟ (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), p. 40.  
196
 Abraham Itty, The ambivalence of nuclear histories, (London; Osiris Inc: 2006), p. 51. 
94 
 
 
  
Realism claims that most political leader in Iran require a bomb mostly for security 
reasons but in actual fact few leaders in the country some even wanted to cancel the 
program during the Cold War.
197
 Iran with a stronger GDP and sound trade 
percentages is more capable of exploring, initiating and developing nuclear weapons. 
This is important because of the cost involved in nuclear development. Such an 
economic incentive might act as an enabling factor. Commercial development in Iran 
is of paramount importance however this statement was still unclear since there are 
countries with strong GDP and trade balances like Australia and Canada but have no 
nuclear weapons.
198
 Thus economic development is not completely a cause factor in 
nuclear propagation. 
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CONCLUSION 
In the final analysis, the Iran‟s nuclear program might have threat implications to 
regional security both real and perceived. The driving forces behind Iran nuclear 
program are economic, political, social, environmental and military based. Thus, 
there is no one factor behind this nuclear program. The supply-side and demand-side 
shows that Iran‟s nuclear program is very complex and sensitive as it has many 
factors aiding and backing the program such as Chinese and Russian assistance as 
well as locally supplied resources and skills. The security theories offered above 
cannot in this case answer the questions under investigation in isolation. Due to the 
complex nature of the Iranian nuclear program it is important to use all three theories 
to understand the driving forces as none can fully explain the nuclear policy Iran is 
embarking on. Thus, a reawakening in nuclear propagation research is under way.
199
  
 
Realism clearly explains that Iran‟s state egoism and struggle among international 
actors like the USA and Saudi Arabia is due to the naturally selfish nature of the 
concerned states. Thus, Iran might pursue a nuclear program to address this inherent 
nature in international politics. However classical realism implies that Iran is by 
nature offensive and it alleges that the nuclear program is for military purposes 
though not enough evidence has been gathered. On the other realism alleges Iran 
nuclear program is defensive against regional and international threats such as those 
from Israel and Saudi Arabia thus Iran might be balancing power by having a nuclear 
program with a military status which has led other theorists to modify the theory into 
defensive and offensive realism. Defensive realism is a modification of classical 
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realism which when applied to the case of Iran it can be argued that the state pursues 
and maintains defensive and reserved policies in an attempt to attain security due to 
the anarchical structure of the UN international system. This is in contrast to 
offensive realism which argues that Iran might be seeking to maximize her influence 
and power economically, militarily and socially in order to maintain hegemony, 
security and domination as there is no central authority to guarantee the survival of 
actors in the system. Both dimensions might be sound but not clearly verified.
200
 
 
These assumptions therefore reveal that the lack of a central authority combined with 
an egocentric human nature in the international system breeds conflict and struggle 
amongst nations which might explain why Israel is one of the major states in the 
region that regards Iran nuclear program as a threat and alleges that it is meant for 
military reasons. The strength of this argument is based on the evidence of struggle, 
conflict and power maximization socially, economically and politically between 
Israel and Iran in the international system due to a lack of central authority which 
might be said to have been a natural instinct in mankind. It can also be argued that 
the pursuit of nuclear weapons and programs by the Soviet Union and Iran during the 
Cold War era was either defensive or offensive realism or simply a combination of 
both. Therefore, while realism answers a minority of questions in international 
relations, it still leaves the majority questions unanswered such as the role of 
domestic politics in nuclear proliferation. 
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Realism concludes that morality or ethics have no place in the Iranian foreign policy. 
These assumptions are applied to both domestic and international politics of Iran. 
Thus, nuclear decision making in Iran might be free from moral international law 
obligations and hence the launch of controversial nuclear weapons.
201
 „Immoral‟ 
international policies such as the Iranian nuclear program are justified to achieve any 
political ends as eluded by realism. Therefore, whatever is good for the Iran might be 
justified and executed despite its breach of any international law or moral standard, 
civilisation or ethics. This assertion is based on the premise that Iran can adopt 
controversial policies in the international system even if such actions are „evil‟ rather 
for realism, evil is good. These assumptions entail that the highest moral value of 
Iran in having a nuclear program is that of survival in terms of both military and 
economic energy produced through nuclear fuel and the protection of the Iran by any 
means necessary or unnecessary and that securing, maintaining and promoting 
national power is a duty and right of Iran.   
 
It might be argued that international agreements are binding only when they are 
beneficial to Iran but in essence they could be easily broken once they threaten the 
survival of the state. From this basis, it can be argued that Machiavelli‟s realism was 
pragmatic in explaining the events leading to the development of nuclear program in 
Iran between 1945 and 2015. This period can be said to be a combination of power 
and influence in policies of war and economics for power maximisation in the 
region.  
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Realism is of the view that politics in Iran, similarly to society, is administered 
through objective laws which are influenced by human nature. A nature which is 
eternal: Hence it is plausible to develop a theory that reflects the presence of such 
objective laws as nuclear policies and programs. The main feature of political realism 
in the case of Iran is the function of interest explained in terms of power. Political 
realism argues in favour of the rationality, objectivity and unemotional political and 
social behaviours expressed by domestic actors in Iran. Iran‟s interest in terms of 
power is an objective categorization which is generally valid but not with a one size 
fit all meaning. Power should be seen therefore as the control and dominance of man 
over man including the development of nuclear programs by Iran as a way to 
dominate regional politics and have a say in global affairs. 
 
Political realism recognizes the moral importance of any of political behaviour in 
Iran. It is not blind to moralist as such but realism strikes a balance between moral 
demands and prudent political behaviour of actors in Iran. Thus having a nuclear 
program might not be an „immoral‟ issue or a threat but the uses of the program 
might be of concern such as to destroy or to build weapons of mass destruction. The 
political realists maintain the independence of Iran political sphere. By the mere fact 
of being an independent and sovereign state, Iran has a right to develop peaceful 
nuclear programs. 
 
It can also be concluded that politics in Iran, just as in any has society, is governed 
by laws which are objectively rooted in human nature such as the need to maximise 
security and have influence over other actors. In this regard, Iran‟s foreign and 
domestic policies are formulated based on human nature which is egoistic and power 
99 
 
 
  
centric. While there is a challenge on the effects of morality on political actions, 
under realism the political interest of Iran is far more significant than universal 
morality of any given community in international relations. Iran therefore seek to 
purse a foreign and nuclear policy agenda that is both state centric, maximising 
benefits and minimising risks. 
 
Iranian politics is the utility of power in international relations. Thus, one can argue 
that power is the control of man over man. As Iran possesses territories, resources 
and influence ultimately, they will control the way of life in the polity and in the 
region. Power in this regard is defined in terms of Iran‟s political and military 
strength. Therefore, in discussing these ideas it can be argued that political leaders in 
Iran think and act in terms of power defined as political interest. Universal moral 
principles or in modern terms; international laws such as the regulatory NPT cannot 
be fully applied to the actions of Iran as they view morality as a threat to national 
interest. This conclusion is based on the premise that Morgenthau calls for a balance 
in policy between the influences of morality and power as more prudent than any 
extreme end of the two. This is because countries like Iran in the global system are of 
a similar fashion such as units of a state in a domestic structure and they have 
identical interests: Survival. In international politics, the setup of the global political 
system is usually influenced by the notion that Iran would rather survive 
economically and militarily by pursuing controversial political goals based on a long-
term view and they behave with the need to realize that goal by any means necessary. 
The similarity in the behaviour Iran and North Korea nuclear programs over years 
can be argued to have been caused by the limitations on their behaviour imposed by 
the structures of the global system which has an imbalance of power distribution.  
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Constructivism argues for a more internal analysis of political systems within the 
state. Instead of focusing on power capabilities and anarchy, constructivism focuses 
on Iran‟s internal structures such as history, culture, religion and identity to 
determine how Iran is likely to act in the international system. Political and military 
structures determine a state‟s international outlook.202 The relationship between 
Israel and Iran in terms of the potential to be become allies can be forecasted by only 
understanding the military structures of the concerned states. The military 
administration in Iran is more focused towards power maximisation and security as 
seen by their continued push to argue that regional foes are a threat to national 
security hence Iran should balance against any attempts to hegemony by competitors. 
 
Political identifies shapes how foreign policies are crafted. Regime types, systems of 
governance and distribution of power in a state as a system determines the postures a 
state takes in the international stage. This overall determines the types and quality of 
relations a state will have with other actors. Iran‟s Islamic regime might be oriented 
towards developmental projects and self-determination policies as derived from its 
religious values. Nuclear programs thus might be a result of such social identities. 
Iran‟s social structure is one characterised by an overwhelming Islamic populace that 
is very supportive of the government‟s policies. Religion acts as social glue to drive 
the nation towards developmental projects in this case the population will act as 
moral backing to its government. The Supreme Leader of Iran Ali Khamenei has for 
decades rallied the Iranians towards nuclear development policies as means to 
achieve energy and political independence. Therefore, nuclear development in Iran 
has a stronger domestic backing to begin with. 
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Political identities can also include governance structures and political history. These 
two-constructivist variables determine types of international cooperation a state 
might have with other states. For instance, the Russian system of governance and 
political history has various similarities with that of Iran.  Russia believes is self-
assertion and political independence this can be shown in the form of a strong 
military posture. The case also applies with Iran with strong desire for self-assertion 
regionally and internationally. Historical ties between Iran and Russia date back to 
centuries ago as well as during the Cold War the two states enjoyed a relatively 
warm cooperation on various issues such as security and developmental projects. The 
post-Cold War era is marked by increased cooperation between the two countries. 
This might explain from a constructivist perceptive that Iran‟s nuclear program exists 
because of nuclear support from Russia due to the similarities in social and political 
identities. It might be argued that Iran‟s nuclear cooperation with Russia and North 
Korea in terms of expertise, machinery and equipment might be a direct result of 
similar constructive structures. 
 
However, it is important to note that states can still cooperate despite similarities in 
political history or governance structures as claimed by the constructivist theory. İn 
the 1970s France, the USA and Britain contributed to the nuclear development of 
Iran despite having vast differences in types of political identities. This level of 
cooperation implies that there are other factors that drive state action as thus the 
realist assumptions must be taken into account that state cooperate on the basis of 
power maximisation rather than pursing isolationist policies.  
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Constructivism investigates a state‟s discursive power and how this might shape 
international relations. The political social and economic perceptions of a state and 
ultimately the nuclear and foreign policies are a result of ideologies and culture. The 
economic status of Iran backed by a sound oil and scientific research industry 
favours the development of nuclear programs both from an economic stand point as 
well as a scientific view. However how does social culture contribute towards Iran‟s 
defence policy? This is a normative question that requires a new research on the role 
of culture in nuclear and defence policy.  
 
These domestic structures play a significant role state by state in shaping the 
behaviour of states in the international system. Opposing social identities are more 
likely to clash than similar identifies. Iran‟s discursive power is more likely to 
produce an antagonistic view of Israel‟s regional policies and the opposite is true 
since these two states have opposing religion and values as well as opposing political 
histories marked with less cooperation and more conflicts. However, Iran is likely to 
cooperate with Turkey over wide range of issues than it does with Britain. However, 
this does not mean that there are no opportunities between the antagonistic states. 
Similarly states with identical domestic identities might still have different national 
interest goal and they might not even cooperate. Therefore, Iran through its 
discursive power might perceive the acquisition of nuclear weapons as beneficial, 
moral and necessary to its national survival and political influence in the region. 
 
The balance of power is also affected by political and social identities under 
constructivism. Global system can be cooperative or hegemonic depending on the 
dominant political and social identities of states. Constructive substitutes the balance 
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of power with the balance of threats noting that a state might perceive other state‟s 
actions as either a threat of an opportunity hence the concerned state will the craft 
policies to promote the opportunity presented or fend off the potential threats. The 
USA nuclear support to Iran during the Cold War was regarded as an opportunity by 
Iran. Using her discursive power, Iran went on to seize the opportunities presented to 
her by the USA in the form of technical and financial support. However, from the 
early 2000s both the USA and Iran discursive interpretations changed towards each 
other. The USA began to regard Iran as a regional threat to its interest and well as to 
its allies such as Israel. Iran conversely altered and began to view the USA‟s policy 
towards Iran as hostile and manipulative. This shaped the next one and half decade of 
the USA-Iran nuclear relations from 2000 to 2016 which was marked with punitive 
sanctions and counter balances by each side.   
 
Thus, Iran‟s international behaviour and nuclear polices was shaped by its discursive 
power and not just the egocentric desire and anarchy of the international system as 
claimed by the realist school of thought. Constructivism thus offers an alternative 
framework from which international relations can be understood. This framework 
claims that international politics is also a byproduct of social construction and that 
politics originate from the continuous processes of social interaction. There are two 
basic features of constructivism in Iran, first that the systems of human association 
depend largely on shared ideas and culture rather than material external forces alone, 
and that the positions and goals of different actors in the Islamic Republic are a 
product of these established ideas and not by their given nature. 
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A remarkable number of Iranian citizens claim to have a non-negotiable legitimate 
and national right to nuclear technology. Iran has managed to harness these 
nationalist sentiments through social and political tools such as propaganda and 
religion. Therefore, the acquisition of nuclear technology provides Iran with a 
strategic advantage where the nuclear program will be a source of national pride and 
identity thus the Islamic regime would gain more domestic approval. Internationally 
Iran would have more power, influence and control. Forces of nationalism are easily 
generated by the perceptions of Iranian citizens who regard western policies such as 
the USA economic sanctions and regional interventions by the EU in Syria and Iraq 
as hostile and ill-treatment. Thus, there is a legitimate frustration with what Iran 
perceives as security double standard in the nuclear policy that would maintain 
Israel‟s strategic dominance and supremacy but deny nuclear capability and facilities 
to other Iran as an equal and sovereign regional power. Nuclear programs usually 
perceived as a symbol of national pride draws popular support in constructivist 
theories, rather than realist based regional strategic explanations alone. In this case, 
power-centric theories have a limited meaning to Iranian citizens than ideological 
and nationalist sentiments. 
 
They would rather have a counter nuclear policy program even at the expense of 
regional and international balance of power. Thus, to argue only on the basis of 
external forces as a cause of Iran‟s nuclear program is rather shallow and fails to 
capture the whole picture of the forces at play in Iran. States like Iran seek defensive 
or deterrent capabilities due to fear of victimization and the profound biases by 
superpower as to „when and who‟ should possess a nuclear program.  Iran‟s nuclear 
security can be applied to the Copenhagen theory of international relations. The 
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primary framework under Copenhagen is to focus on the aspect of security and its 
implications on state behavior as well as foreign policy. Security best understood 
simply as the condition of being free from threats or danger is a rather broad concept 
that tales into various levels from regional security, sociological and environmental 
and political. 
 
This approach seeks to highlight key differences with realism which only focuses on 
power as the main instrument to achieve security as well as the state as the main unit 
to be granted security. Realism generalizes security into a wholesome concept thus 
fails to accurately offer reasons behind certain state actions that are based on more 
detailed aspects of security with the state concerned. Due to this loophole in realism, 
the theory runs the risk of being outdated and offers a shallow view of world politics. 
The solution offered are not a one size fit all but it captures the ignored components 
of security that helps in the study of international relations. Iran security concerns 
should be viewed from three levels of analysis and five security sectors. The first 
level regards Iran‟s security from an individual perspective, secondly is the state 
level perspective and lastly is the international level perspective. All of these three 
levels operate on one or more of the five security sectors which are based on Iran‟s 
environment, economics, and politics, society and lastly military structures. Security 
levels and security sectors are connected through a network of events and policies 
such that each cannot operate in isolation. Understanding Iran‟s security from an 
individual perspective entails that the condition of individual life such as health, 
economic wellbeing, status, political rights such as freedom have an effect on the 
domestic and international policies crafted in Iran. 
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Therefore, any danger to the conditions of life of individuals in Iran cans be regarded 
as a threat by the state which must be mitigated or regulated through necessary 
policies including development of nuclear programs. To understand the link between 
individual security and nuclear program development one has to understand the five 
sectors of security.
203
 Economically, nuclear programs are a form of employment 
creation considering the massive labor forces needed to run such projects on a 
national scale. Politically the nuclear program offers social status to Iranian citizens 
and generates high sense of national identity as Iran is viewed as a technologically 
developing and emerging state. Nuclear programs are thus related to economic 
development. Threats to human security become threats to national securıty as the 
citizen is at the core of the state and makes up the state of Iran. 
 
Political security is much tied to state level of security. Iran‟s political security can 
be argued to have been derived from nuclear program as such large-scale projects 
offers a state respect and even generates fear among other states as to the scope and 
nature of the nuclear program. Iran with a nuclear program especially for military 
purposes is likely to have more political control, influence, power and authority 
regionally an internationally by offsetting the balance of power and tilting it in her 
favor since control as very feel states possess such a capability with exception of 
India and Pakistan and Israel. Iran requıres political, economic and military leverage 
to have a more effective role in the decision making at the international stage and all 
these seem to be offered by way of nuclear programs. Thus, Iran might see a 
purposive reason to have nuclear program as far much beneficial than not having 
one. This might also explain why the permanent members of the UNSC are all 
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nuclear marred states. All sectors have a bearing on levels of security‟s which in turn 
determines a state priority in international politics. A more interesting argument is 
the link between the sectors and the concept of threats. 
 
Economic security in Iran should not be viewed in terms of threats only but also in 
terms of opportunity. Economic security can refer to sound financial wellbeing at the 
state level.  States with strong economies are more capable of undertaking expensive 
projects such as the USA and Russia during the industrial revolution. Iran has 
enjoyed a relatively sound economy with competitive trade figures and healthy GDP 
in the region backed by the oil industry, the state has been able to generate billions of 
dollars that can easily be channeled into other development projects including 
nuclear programs.
204
 Threats and opportunities of an economic nature are relatively 
difficult to investigate due to economic manipulation of fiscal and monetary policies 
by states of which Iran cannot be excluded.  To base research findings on the 
economic indicators as drivers of nuclear proliferation alone one may run the risk of 
over simplifying a very much complicated subject. Nonetheless economics might 
explain why Iran pursues a nuclear program since it has a sound economic structure 
able to facilitate the costly research and development of nuclear weapons. 
 
Environmental security has become a very important subject due to the green 
revolution whereby states are shifting towards cleaner forms of energy as opposed to 
pollution and climate change threats like the use of fossil fuels and unclean sources 
such as petrol and oil. States that depend on oil industries are beginning to notice the 
increased risks of over dependence on single market commodities. In case global 
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decline in oil prices or the availability of cleaner fuel, these states tend to run the risk 
of facing economic crises as their economies depend on oil. Saudi Arabia has begun 
diversifying its economy and reducing over reliance on oil by opening investments in 
other sectors such as property and tourism and well as holding gold and foreign and 
bonds in foreign reserves.  
 
Iran is no exception as an oil producing state it is more beneficial to have other forms 
of sustainable energy in the future including peaceful nuclear energy which Iran is 
already entitled to have under the NPT. Due to environmental reasons, certainly Iran 
would be in better position with nuclear energy than with oil in the next fifty years. 
However, states are notorious for hiding their nuclear plans under the disguise of 
peaceful energy when in fact they project serve other motives. Therefore, researches 
should not conclude that this is the main reason why Iran is pursing nuclear programs 
but only one probability amongst many. 
 
The right to social security is cherished in many countries and Iran is not an 
exception. There is a strong connection between political and social security 
therefore the two cannot be isolated. States with strong social security tend to have 
more robot political systems.
205
 Iran as a state is made up of citizens each having a 
national identity. This identity can be expressed in the form of shared religious 
beliefs and patriotism. The type of government in Iran was formed through a popular 
vote thus citizen have an indirect impact on the kind of administration which is 
elected to govern the masses this also affects the types of domestic and foreign 
policies the state will craft and implement.  
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The vast number of global conflicts are a result of social differences such as the 
Syrian civil war between ISIS and the Assad monarchy as well as the perpetual threat 
of war between North Korea and South Korea which is mostly a social identity 
conflict as to who is the „genuine Korean‟. When such a variable is taken onto the 
case of Iran it can be argued that Iran‟s nuclear program seeks to maximize the 
state‟s power as a Shia Islamic republic with an 83% Shia majority population in 
relation to other regional Sunni Muslim states like Saudi Arabia and Iraq. This might 
explain why Saudi Arabia supported Iraq in the 1980-1988 war against Iran. 
Conflicts are bound to happen due to differences in culture and civilizations which in 
turn determine threats, vulnerabilities, foes and allies between Iran and actors like 
Saudi Arabia and the USA.
206
 
 
Cultural and social differences shape the global system therefore this sector of 
security ought to be applied to the case of Iran. The major problem however is that 
the concept of social security is rather broad to investigate at the international system 
due to the various cultures in existence today. Several questions can be raised as to 
which culture is preferable over another. Civilizations determine types of 
government this explains why the USA is more liberal state with a democratic nature 
as opposed to Iran which more theocratic and patrimonial. States with difference 
civilizations are more likely to clash on a global level although opportunities for 
cooperation can exist. The realist argued against the value of morals and social 
values in international politics as of less significance to the behavior of states this 
proposition seem to neglect the most important unit from which states are formed 
which is the individual citizen. 
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Another important sector of security is regional security this approach investigates 
the concept of security on a regional level which is a subset of the international level 
of analysis offered by the researcher. The sector can be argued to be the intermediate 
between the state and the international system. In order to comprehend international 
relation, it is critical to understand the politics, forces, actors and nature of regional 
structures as they determine the conduct of states in the region and internationally. 
Regions are present member states with many unique opportunities and threats. 
These pros and cons determine what states do in response to the challenges presented 
therefore. The Middle East has been marked by series of instability for decades with 
the Iran-Iraq war of 1980s, the 1990 Iraq-Kuwait war, the civil wars in Yemen, 
Afghanistan, Syria, Pakistan and the ongoing Israeli–Lebanese conflict which started 
in 1948. 
 
The pursuit of nuclear programs in Iran drew regional and international attention and 
the issue became a major diplomatic and political challenge since the early 2000s. 
Whether the program is peaceful or not there is no doubt that the program challenges 
the status quo and threatens the balance of power in the region. The Middle East has 
been a very fragile region for years and therefore Iran emerging as a nuclear power 
would further destabilize the region‟s geopolitical landscape. The Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) member states have shown greater concern and worry about the 
nuclear program forcing them to refine their foreign policies using instruments 
ranging from accommodation to outright antagonism with even the possibility of 
obtaining counterbalance nuclear deterrent capabilities on the table. 
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Uncertainty has become the order of the day in the Middle East as to what dimension 
does the Iran nuclear program possess. Military dimensions of the nuclear program 
remain ambiguous and unproven although they are a probability. Nonetheless 
regional tension has increased ever since the inception of the programs irrespective 
of the fact the regime in Iran as consistency assured other states that the program 
does not carry any military threat and is solely meant for civilian energy. Several 
researchers made attempts to investigate the regional implication of the nuclear 
program in Iran with several approaches concluding that the issue will lead to 
inevitable conflicts. Nuclear programs especially those with a weapons dimension 
tend to balance the power matrix as seen by the Cold War passive conflict between 
USSR and the USA. This is so because of the concept of mutually assured 
destruction whereby no actor will emerge victorious in the event of a nuclear war but 
rather damage will be almost mutual. 
 
Nuclear weapons might also cause an arms race that can be more lethal and leads to 
further regional instability as opposed to them having a positive balancing of power 
effect. In the event that Iran acquires nuclear weapons there is a high probability of 
regional shock as the geostrategic balance of power tilts disproportionally in the 
favor of Iran at the expense of other regional players. For instance, deterrence 
measure between Iran and Israel are likely to cause a serious security dilemma. 
Regional defense policies of Iran might seem offensive to the GCC member states as 
well as to Israel resulting in more conflicts. The GCC member states perceive İran to 
be hostile and these include Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia, United Arab 
Emirates and Qatar. These states are more likely to develop a joint counter threat 
formation that triggers more instability considering the magnitude of the players 
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involved. This is because states tend to naturally react to an emerging power by 
counter balancing the perceived „aggressor‟ as opposed to appeasing it. 
 
The capabilities of the GCC members states as well as Israel to respond to a threating 
Iran is quite remarkable. Oil rich GCC states possess a combined economic capacity 
to fast tract the possibility of counter nuclear proliferation measures if they seek to. 
Israel on the other hand as significant political, financial and military back up of the 
USA and the EU since these players already regard Iran as problematic. This means a 
conflict between Israel and Iran would not only be regional but would extend into the 
international system politically, economically and militarily with a potential 
preemptive strive coming from Israel. 
 
While these events might seem disconnected they have a serious bearing on regional 
security and they shape the security outlook of regional players. Pakistan has nuclear 
weapons and possesses a threat to regional players who may regard the state as 
having high security leverage over other states like Iran. Thus, Iran will either form a 
security community with allies in the region based on shared interested and mutual 
trust or she will regard the region as a conflict formation whereby there is high 
suspicion and fear and limited cooperation. The security community of Iran includes 
allies such as Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority. Iran‟s defense policies 
are more favorable towards these states and entities. On the other side Iran, will have 
a conflict formation with regional players such as Israel and Saudi Arabia which in 
turn determines types of defense polices Iran might purse including a nuclear 
program with a military dimension. A nuclear weapons program provides a security 
deterrent that might protects Iran in cases of attacks which could be one of the 
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reasons why the state has a nuclear program. 
 
All factors being taken into account there is more proof that supports the conclusion 
that a nuclear armed Iran could drastically alter the balance of power in the region 
and threat the already fragile region into further turmoil and conflict. Fears of 
hegemonic conduct by Iran and expansionist ambitions through the support of none 
state hostile actors could create new security dilemmas capable of initiating a 
regional arms race if not an international arms race. Broken and weak diplomatic 
channels could lead to more suspicion and high probability of preemptive strikes by 
regional and global players who are hostile to Iran. 
 
In the final analysis, the causes of the Iran nuclear program are much more complex 
than this research effort could ever present. However as shown there are clues that 
can be derived from the theoretical frameworks such as a realism, constructive and 
Copenhagen. The strength of realism is based on the notion that the state is the main 
actor in international relations thus narrows down the research to one major unit of 
analysis. Survival proves that states are willing to do whatever it takes to have an 
edge in an anarchical system. The break of realism into defensive and offensive 
categories is an effective way to understand the behavior of conservative superpower 
who tend to maintain the status quo as opposed to aggressive emerging stares or 
rivals who tend to seek a redress of the status quo. The Iran nuclear program has a 
much more realist dimension than can ever be imagined due to the nature of 
international attention the policy has attracted implying that states regard the 
program as a game change of some sort in the Middle East. 
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However, realism fails to capture the internal factors of the state which makes a 
clearer analysis in understand date behavior. Constructivism tends to fill in the 
loopholes left by realism such as the discussion on the domestic actors and variable 
responsible for the behavior of a state at the international level. The only risk that 
constructivism faces is running the risk of over analyzing and complicating research 
through introduction of domestic variables such as culture and religion as a factor in 
understanding state behavior. Constructivism fails to capture the structure of the 
international system thus does not provide a clean framework of the playing field on 
which states operate.  
 
While constructivism and realism answers specific questions about internal and 
external factors, the Copenhagen approach tends to be the bridge between the two 
theories. By introducing the notion of security and its various levels as well as 
sectors, the Copenhagen approach reveals that the Iran nuclear program becomes a 
much more understandable from a security perspective rather than a constructive 
notion or a state centric paradigm alone. It is important to note that the realist theory 
has more merits in explaining the causes of the nuclear program in Iran and therefore 
even if no theory should be used in isolation, some theories tend to have an edge over 
others. It might also be prudent for further researchers to add upon this work as a 
starting premise to better understand factors influencing nuclear proliferation in Iran. 
However, in general the nuclear proliferation in Iran has a domestic and international 
cause to it which involves a complex network of variables such as state interest, 
economics, social structures, regional politics and security complexes. Ultimately the 
nuclear program also has an impact on regional security as a whole. 
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